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ANCILLARY ENFORCEMENT JURISDICTION: 
THE MISINTERPRETATION OF KOKKONEN AND 
EXPUNGEMENT PETITIONS 
ABSTRACT 
Criminal records do not always provide the disposition of the case. 
Therefore, in some circumstances, individuals who were arrested and 
subsequently had their charges dismissed or who were acquitted at trial are not 
always distinguishable from those convicted of a crime. For those individuals 
who were convicted of a crime, criminal records additionally do not always 
provide information on the crime you were convicted of. Consequently, the 
proliferation in access to background checks has resulted in the stigma 
associated with an arrest record becoming a significant barrier to employment 
and housing opportunities for individuals with a record.  
Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Kokkonen v. Guardian Life 
Insurance Co. of America, nearly every federal circuit had held that district 
courts had ancillary jurisdiction to entertain motions to expunge criminal 
records solely under equitable considerations. District courts, in deciding these 
petitions, would balance the interests of the individuals in having their records 
expunged against the interests of the public in having the records widely 
available. Because of the great strength of the public interest in the availability 
of these records, a court would only grant these petitions in extraordinary 
circumstances. 
The Court in Kokkonen attempted to clarify the scope of the murky and ill-
defined ancillary jurisdiction doctrine. The Court set forth two circumstances in 
which ancillary jurisdiction had generally been asserted: “(1) to permit 
disposition by a single court of claims that are, in varying respects and degrees, 
factually interdependent . . . and (2) to enable a court to function successfully, 
that is, to manage its proceedings, vindicate its authority, and effectuate its 
decrees . . . .” After this decision was cast down, there has been a domino effect 
of federal circuits holding they no longer have the authority to assert ancillary 
jurisdiction over equitable expungement motions reasoning that they do not fall 
within the reach of the test Kokkonen articulates.  
Unfortunately for individuals with criminal records, these circuit courts 
interpret the Court’s decision in Kokkonen far too narrowly. Accordingly, this 
Comment argues that neither the language of the holding in Kokkonen nor the 
holding itself warrant the restrictive interpretation that these circuits apply. 
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These lower courts are disregarding the qualifying language the Court 
employed and the cues the Court gave that demonstrate its intent was not to set 
a strict standard for ancillary jurisdiction.  
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“The mere fact that a man has been arrested has very little, if any, probative 
value in showing that he has engaged in any misconduct.”  
—Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 241 (1957) 
INTRODUCTION 
The United States has a glaring need for an equitable mechanism to enable 
a federal court to expunge criminal records. This need is exemplified by the fact 
that out of the roughly 327 million people living in the United States today,1 
more than 100 million have arrest records.2 To put that into perspective: If the 
100 million people in the United States with arrest records formed their own 
country, that new country would rank in the top twenty countries by world 
population.3 Even more startling, researchers have estimated that by the age of 
twenty-three, nearly one-third of Americans4 and roughly 50% of African-
American males will have been arrested.5  
If an individual is arrested, that individual has a criminal record.6 However, 
the fact that an individual has a record is not indicative of whether that individual 
committed any criminal act.7 Accordingly, criminal records are misleading, 
which stems from the fact that they do not always distinguish between 
individuals who have had their charges dismissed, are acquitted at trial, or are 
convicted of a crime.8  
This lack of delineation about the ultimate outcome of a case is displayed in 
a study conducted by the National Employment Law Project.9 The study found 
 
 1 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/popclock/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2020). 
 2 U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL GUIDANCE ON APPLICATION OF 
FAIR HOUSING ACT STANDARDS TO THE USE OF CRIMINAL RECORDS BY PROVIDERS OF HOUSING AND REAL 
ESTATE-RELATED TRANSACTIONS 1 (2016).  
 3 Matthew Friedman, Just Facts: As Many Americans Have Criminal Records as College Diplomas, 
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Nov. 17, 2015), http://www.brennancenter.org/blog/just-facts-many-americans-have-
criminal-records-college-diplomas. 
 4 Mark Memmott, More Than 30 Percent of Americans Are Arrested by Age 23, Study Says, NPR (Dec. 
11, 2011, 9:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2011/12/19/143947345/more-than-30-percent-
of-americans-arrested-by-age-23-study-says.  
 5 Study: Nearly Half of Black Men Arrested by Age 23, USA TODAY, https://www.usatoday.com/story/ 
news/nation/2014/01/20/nearly-half-arrested/4669225/ (last updated Jan. 20, 2014, 5:23 PM).  
 6 Tina Rosenberg, Opinion, Have You Ever Been Arrested? Check Here, N.Y. TIMES (May 24, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/24/opinion/have-you-ever-been-arrested-check-here.html.  
 7 Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs, 353 U.S. 232, 241 (1957); United States v. Zapete-Garcia, 447 F.3d 
57, 60 (1st Cir. 2006). 
 8 See MADELINE NEIGHLY & MAURICE EMSELLEM, NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, WANTED, ACCURATE 
FBI BACKGROUND CHECKS FOR EMPLOYMENT, REWARD: GOOD JOBS 3 (2013). 
 9 Id.  
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that 50% of FBI records do not include the final disposition of the case.10 
Additionally, the study discovered that “a majority of the U.S. population live 
in states where more than 30 percent of the arrest records . . . do not include . . . 
the final outcome of the case.”11 Thus, the stigma associated with a record, 
regardless of conviction, and what the conviction was for, can pose substantial 
problems for an arrestee in today’s society. Loretta Lynch, while Attorney 
General of the United States, observed that in the current state of society in the 
United States, the stigma associated with a criminal record places an individual 
at a sometimes-insurmountable disadvantage:  
Too often, Americans who have paid their debt to society leave prison 
only to find that they continue to be punished for past mistakes. They 
might discover that they are ineligible for student loans, putting an 
education out of reach. They might struggle to get a driver’s license, 
making employment difficult to find and sustain. Landlords might 
deny them housing because of their criminal records—an 
unfortunately common practice. They might even find that they are not 
allowed to vote based on misguided state laws that prevent returning 
citizens from taking part in civic life.12 
This stigma has extreme negative consequences in employment and housing 
opportunities, as well as increases the chances of recidivism.13 Accordingly, 
these consequences act as a catalyst for a self-feeding cycle that is arduous for a 
person with a criminal record to detach themselves from.  
The cycle begins with an arrest. Afterwards, a person either has her charges 
dismissed, pleads guilty, or is convicted or acquitted at trial.14 Regardless of the 
outcome of the case, that person now has a record15 which plays a stifling role 
in her ability to gain employment.16 This record, coupled with the struggle to 
find employment, further contributes to a lack of housing opportunities.17 
Altogether, the difficulty of finding adequate employment and stable housing 
 
 10 Id. at 1.  
 11 Id. at 2.  
 12 Loretta E. Lynch, U.S. Att’y Gen., Remarks at National Reentry Week Event in Philadelphia (Apr. 25, 
2016).  
 13 See United States v. McKnight, 33 F. Supp. 3d 577, 585–88 (D. Md. 2014); Zainab Wurie, Tainted: 
The Need for Equity Based Federal Expungement, 6 S. REGION BLACK L. STUDENTS ASS’N L.J. 31, 35–38 
(2012); Anna Kessler, Comment, Excavating Expungement Law: A Comprehensive Approach, 87 TEMP. L. REV. 
403, 404–08 (2015). 
 14 Stages of a Criminal Case, JUSTIA, https://www.justia.com/criminal/docs/stages-of-a-criminal-case/ 
(last updated Apr. 2018).  
 15 Rosenberg, supra note 6. 
 16 See infra notes 24–33 and accompanying text.  
 17 See infra notes 36–48 and accompanying text.  
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has a strong correlation to increased recidivism rates.18 Thus, the cycle starts 
over again, with an arrest.  
Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Kokkonen v. Guardian Life 
Insurance Co. of America,19 a district court had the authority, through the 
exercise of ancillary jurisdiction, to save an individual from this vicious cycle 
solely under equitable considerations.20 A court could exercise its ancillary 
jurisdiction in response to an individual’s petition to have their record 
expunged.21 However, after the Court decided Kokkonen, circuit courts, starting 
with the Ninth Circuit, began holding one by one that the Court’s decision 
precluded district courts from exercising ancillary jurisdiction to hear 
expungement petitions that raise solely equitable considerations.22 This 
Comment argues that this interpretation of Kokkonen is far narrower than the 
language of Kokkonen suggests and further asserts that a district court’s 
jurisdiction to expunge criminal records under solely equitable considerations is 
not precluded by the Supreme Court’s holding. 
Part I of this Comment provides an overview of the employment and housing 
issues presented to individuals with criminal records as well as discusses how 
those issues lead into increased recidivism rates. Part II summarizes the three 
potential sources of authority for a court to hear expungement petitions and sets 
forth the different federal and state approaches to each source of authority. Part 
III examines the ancillary jurisdiction doctrine that survived the passage of the 
supplemental jurisdiction statue and analyzes the intricacies of the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Kokkonen. Part IV sets forth the circuits’ approaches to 
equitable expungement before and after Kokkonen. Lastly, Part V explains that 
the circuit courts are interpreting Kokkonen far too narrowly, describes the 
proper interpretation of Kokkonen, and illuminates how the expunging of 
criminal records solely under equitable considerations falls under the correct 
interpretation of Kokkonen.  
  
 
 18 See infra notes 53–58. 
 19 511 U.S. 375 (1994).  
 20 E.g., United States v. Friesen, 853 F.2d 816, 817 (10th Cir. 1988); Allen v. Webster, 742 F.2d 153, 
154–55 (4th Cir. 1984); United States v. Schnitzer, 567 F.2d 536, 539 (2d Cir. 1977). 
 21 E.g., Friesen, 853 F.2d at 817; Allen, 742 F.2d at 154–55; Schnitzer, 567 F.2d at 539. 
 22 E.g., United States v. Wahi, 850 F.3d 296, 302–03 (7th Cir. 2017); United States v. Coloian, 480 F.3d 
47, 50–52 (1st Cir. 2007); United States v. Sumner, 226 F.3d 1005, 1014–15 (9th Cir. 2000). 
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I. ISSUES EQUITABLE EXPUNGEMENT HAS THE POTENTIAL TO REMEDY 
The stigma that attaches to an individual with a criminal record places that 
individual at a significant disadvantage in various aspects of today’s society. 
This effect is exacerbated by the increase in accessibility of background 
checks.23 Therefore, today, more than ever before, there is a need for the ability 
to petition to get one’s criminal record expunged. This Part first addresses the 
employment issues an individual with a criminal record faces. Second, this Part 
examines these individuals’ difficulties in finding housing and observes how the 
government is not necessarily alleviating this problem. Lastly, this Part 
recognizes how the hurdles in gaining employment and finding housing act as a 
springboard for increased recidivism rates.  
A. Employment Issues 
The stigma attached to a criminal record presents a significant barrier to 
employment.24 This barrier is further fortified with the proliferation of 
background checks.25 The rise in background checks and an employer’s access 
to them has been spurred by advances in technology.26 According to a survey 
primarily of large employers, 92% of the employers stated that they conduct a 
background check on some, if not all, of their job candidates.27 Furthermore, 
63% of the employers in the study, despite knowing that a candidate was not 
convicted, stated that the arrest of a prospective candidate would still play at 
least a minimal role in deciding whether to extend an offer to that candidate.28 
Additionally, a survey conducted in major cities, regarding individuals that were 
 
 23 See Valerie Schneider, The Prison to Homelessness Pipeline: Criminal Record Checks, Race, and 
Disparate Impact, 93 IND. L.J. 421, 428 (2018) (noting that “an entire industry has arisen to respond to the 
demand” for electronic criminal records). See generally United States v. McKnight, 33 F. Supp. 3d 577, 585–88 
(D. Md. 2014); Wurie, supra note 13, at 35; Kessler, supra note 13, at 441; Background Checking: Conducting 
Criminal Background Checks, SOC’Y FOR HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. (Jan. 22, 2010), https://www.slideshare.net/ 
shrm/background-check-criminal?from=share_email.  
 24 See generally McKnight, 33 F. Supp. 3d at 585–88; Wurie, supra note 13, at 33; Kessler, supra note 
13, at 404–08.  
 25 Supra note 23.  
 26 Kimani Paul-Emile, Reconsidering Criminal Background Checks: Race, Gender, and Redemption, 25 
S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 395, 401 (2016). 
 27 Background Checking: Conducting Criminal Background Checks, supra note 23. 
 28 Id. An arrest record may not be the only reason for denying a prospective candidate. EQUAL EMP. 
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON THE CONSIDERATION OF ARREST AND CONVICTION 
RECORDS IN EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS UNDER TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (2012). However, 
this restriction is limited because an “employer may make an employment decision based on the conduct 
underlying an arrest. . . .” Id. 
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convicted of a crime, found that 65% of employers “would not knowingly hire 
an ex-convict.”29  
With that being said, there are federal and state regulations that attempt to 
tear down some of the barriers ex-convicts face in obtaining employment.30 
These regulations provide tax incentives to businesses that hire ex-convicts.31 
For example, to stimulate the hiring of ex-felons, the Internal Revenue Service 
gives a federal tax credit to employers that hire an ex-felon within a year of being 
convicted or released from prison.32 Unfortunately, the harsh reality is that the 
consequences of increase in access to background checks are that individuals 
with criminal records often resort to taking less desirable, lower-paying jobs or 
no job at all, which feeds into a lack of housing opportunities and ultimately 
increased rates of recidivism.33  
Although the proliferation in access to criminal background checks does 
have negative impact on individuals with records in the employment context, a 
lack of access to criminal records may likewise have a detrimental effect on 
employers. Stemming from the common law, an employer has a duty to protect 
her patrons and bystanders from reasonably foreseeable harm caused by her 
employees.34 Accordingly, an employer could potentially open herself up to 
substantial liability if she is not vigilant in her hiring practices.35 Thus, the 
interests of an employer and an individual with a record can be at odds with each 
other. A key to resolving these dueling interests is striking the balance between 
denying job applicants who pose a risk in a particular occupation and accepting 
the individuals that pose no risk and would excel in that role given the 
opportunity.  
 
 29 Joseph C. Dugan, Note, I Did My Time: The Transformation of Indiana’s Expungement Law, 90 IND. 
L.J. 1321, 1323 (2015). 
 30 See, e.g., 35 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/216 (2018) (tax credit for wages paid to ex-offenders); IOWA ADMIN. 
CODE r. 701-40.21 (2019) (tax credit for small businesses that hire ex-felons); Work Opportunity Tax Credit, 
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/work-opportunity-
tax-credit (last visited Jan. 30, 2020) (providing federal tax incentives to businesses that hire ex-felons within a 
year their conviction or release from prison).  
 31 See, e.g., supra note 30. 
 32 Work Opportunity Tax Credit, supra note 30. 
 33 See Lahny R. Silva, Clean Slate: Expanding Expungements and Pardons for Non-Violent Federal 
Offenders, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 155, 162–63 (2010); see also Jenny Roberts, Expunging America’s Rap Sheet in 
the Information Age, 2015 WISC. L. REV. 321, 333 (noting studies that illustrate that individuals who are able to 
obtain employment have lower rates of recidivism). 
 34 See Terence G. Connor & Kevin J. White, The Consideration of Arrest and Conviction Records in 
Employment Decisions: A Critique of the EEOC Guidance, 43 SETON HALL L. REV. 971, 974 (2013). 
 35 See id. at 972–73. 
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B. Housing Issues 
A person with a criminal record who is struggling to find employment is also 
presented with the issue of finding housing. Although an arrest record without a 
conviction alone is insufficient grounds for a private property owner to reject a 
housing application,36 that does not preclude discrimination on the basis of arrest 
records.37 This serves as a restriction on private property owners from having a 
broad policy of denying any applicant with a criminal record but does not 
prohibit landowners from considering arrest records.38 The consideration of 
records, coupled with the multitude of other factors, such as income, credit, and 
job history, afford landlords wide discretion in contemplating housing 
applications.39 Taking this into account, scholars have observed that, in practice, 
“the mere existence of [a] criminal record serves as a bar to obtaining suitable 
housing.”40  
For individuals who have been convicted of a crime, as opposed to those 
merely arrested, certain federal policies present a much larger problem for their 
search for housing. Under the Fair Housing Act, a private property owner may 
refuse a housing application because of the applicant’s prior criminal 
conviction.41 Hence, an ex-convict’s best chance at having a roof over her head 
may be through public housing.42 However, the guidelines for the Department 
of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) provide that a Public Housing 
Agency (PHA) has the discretion to rely on arrest records in determining 
whether to accept or deny a person’s application.43  
Further, HUD has adopted a “one strike policy” for certain criminal acts.44 
Under this policy, if a member of a household commits one of the enumerated 
 
 36 U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., supra note 2, at 5. 
 37 See Schneider, supra note 23; see also Corinne A. Carey, No Second Chance: People with Criminal 
Records Denied Access to Public Housing, 36 U. TOL. L. REV. 545, 546 (2005).  
 38 Camila Domonoske, Denying Housing over Criminal Record May Be Discrimination, Feds Say, NPR 
(Apr. 4, 2016, 1:14 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/04/04/472878724/denying-housing-
over-criminal-record-may-be-discrimination-feds-say.  
 39 See generally Four Reasons Why a Landlord Can (and Can’t) Reject a Rental Application, LAW 
DICTIONARY, https://thelawdictionary.org/article/four-reason-landlord-can-cant-reject-rental-application/ (last 
visited Mar. 21, 2020).  
 40 Schneider, supra note 23, at 424.  
 41 U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., supra note 2, at 6. However, the property owner must have a 
nondiscriminatory and substantial interest in rejecting the housing application. Id.  
 42 Carey, supra note 38, at 552. 
 43 Id. at 566.  
 44 See 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6) (2012); Public Housing Lease and Grievance Procedure, 24 C.F.R. § 966.4 
(l)(5)(i)–(iv) (2017). See generally Burton v. Tampa Hous. Auth., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1314, 1315 (M.D. Fla. 2000) 
(drug-related activity); Lowell Hous. Auth. v. Melendez, 865 N.E.2d 741, 745 (Mass. 2007) (“violent crimes”); 
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criminal acts or a criminal act that “threatens the health, safety or right to 
peaceful enjoyment of the other residents,” she is to be evicted.45 What exactly 
falls under the “threatens the health, safety or right to peaceful enjoyment of 
other residents” is largely up to the discretion of the PHA.46 Hence, the breadth 
of these policies has had the detrimental effect of “increasing rates of recidivism, 
and harming public safety.”47  
Similar to the responsibility employers have to protect their patrons from 
foreseeable harm, landlords may be liable for the acts of their tenants and 
therefore also have a robust interest in widespread access to criminal background 
checks.48 Landlords have been found liable for the actions of their tenants in an 
array of circumstances. Such circumstances include, inter alia, when a tenant 
commits a criminal act and the landlord should have known that the tenant was 
dangerous49 and when a tenant’s action or inaction results in a nuisance.50 
Furthermore, if a landlord’s property is associated with illegal drugs, regardless 
of whether the landlord actually knew the drugs were present, the landlord’s 
property may be subject to a civil forfeiture action.51 Thus, analogous to the 
dueling interests of an employer and potential employee with a record, a balance 
needs to be struck between the clashing interests of a landlord and a prospective 
tenant. 
C. Increase in Recidivism 
The struggles to gain employment and find housing feeds into increased rates 
of recidivism for individuals with a criminal record.52 These individuals are 
 
Hous. & Redevelopment Auth. v. Miller, 935 A.2d 1197, 1998 (N,J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007) (“disorderly 
persons offense”).  
 45 24 C.F.R. § 996.4(f)(12)(i)(A)(1); see Burton, 171 F. Supp. 2d at 1315 (noting that, under the 
regulation, a lessee is obligated to ensure that a person under their control does not act in a way that “threatens 
the health, safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment” of other residents). A PHA is financed by the federal 
government and runs and operates its local housing programs. HUD’s Public Housing Program, DEP’T HOUSING 
& URB. DEV., https://www.hud.gov/topics/rental_assistance/phprog (last visited Feb. 26, 2020).  
 46 Mackenzie J. Yee, Note, Expungement Law: An Extraordinary Remedy for an Extraordinary Harm, 
25 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 169, 173 (2017).  
 47 Schneider, supra note 23, at 431–32; see also Carey, supra note 38, at 566 (arguing that 
“[h]omelessness itself is a predictor for recidivism”).  
 48 See Rebecca Oyama, Do Not (Re)Enter: The Rise of Criminal Background Tenant Screening as a 
Violation of the Fair Housing Act, 15 MICH. J. RACE & L. 181, 190–91 (2009). 
 49 B.A. Glesner, Landlords as Cops: Tort, Nuisance & Forfeiture Standards Imposing Liability on 
Landlords for Crime on the Premises, 42 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 679, 711 (1992).  
 50 Id. at 724.  
 51 Id. at 740–41.  
 52 See United States v. McKnight, 33 F. Supp. 3d 577, 586–87 (D. Md. 2014); see also Carey, supra note 
38, at 566 (noting that “[h]omelessness itself is a predictor for recidivism”).  
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more likely to commit crimes of survival such as burglary and theft to acquire 
money to support themselves.53 A study conducted by the Federal Bureau of 
Prisons found that ex-offenders that were able to obtain post-release 
employment had a recidivism rate of 27.6 percent “compared to 53.9 percent” 
for those that did not obtain post-release employment.54 Moreover, a survey 
conducted in New York of individuals released from prison determined that an 
ex-offender that is unable to find suitable housing is seven times more likely to 
recidivate than an ex-offender that does find housing.55  
The increased recidivism, however, counteracts one of the chief goals of the 
criminal justice system. As the Supreme Court stated in Kelly v. Robinson, “[t]he 
criminal justice system is not operated primarily for the benefit of victims, but 
for the benefit of society as a whole. . . . [I]t is concerned not only with punishing 
the offender, but also rehabilitating him.”56 The clash between the goal of 
rehabilitation and the ultimate recidivism of a substantial portion of individuals 
with criminal records presents society with a catch-22—the public benefit of 
having criminal records liberally and widely available to the public57 directly 
conflicts with the harm to the public as a consequence of substantial rates of 
recidivism.  
II. SOURCES OF THE COURTS’ JURISDICTION TO EXPUNGE RECORDS 
There are three potential sources of jurisdiction for a federal court to 
expunge criminal records: (1) the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction to expunge 
criminal records on equitable grounds; (2) legislation passed by Congress 
granting the federal court jurisdiction; and (3) a cause of action brought in court 
by an individual whose constitutional rights have been violated.58 Currently, a 
majority of federal circuits hold that courts do not have ancillary jurisdiction to 
expunge criminal records on equitable grounds.59 This Comment argues that 
 
 53 See Schneider, supra note 23, at 432–33. 
 54 MILES D. HARER, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS OFFICE OF RESEARCH & EVALUATION, RECIDIVISM 
AMONG FEDERAL PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1987, at 4–5 (1994). 
 55 Schneider, supra note 23, at 432–33. 
 56 479 U.S. 36, 52 (1986).  
 57 Infra note 73 and accompanying text.  
 58 See United States v. Dunegan, 251 F.3d 477, 480 (3d Cir. 2001) (“[I]n the absence of any applicable 
statute enacted by Congress, or an allegation that the criminal proceedings were invalid or illegal, a District 
Court does not have the jurisdiction to expunge a criminal record . . . .”); United States v. Schnitzer, 567 F.2d 
536, 539 (2d Cir. 1977) (“No federal statute provide[d] for the expungement of an arrest record. Instead, 
expungement lies within the equitable discretion of the court . . . .”).  
 59 See, e.g., United States v. Wahi, 850 F.3d 296, 298 (2017) (noting the trend of federal circuits holding 
that they do not retain ancillary jurisdiction after Kokkonen). But see United States v. McKnight, 33 F. Supp. 3d 
577, 582–83 (D. Md. 2014) (holding the court had jurisdiction under the second circumstance in Kokkonen); 
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federal courts do, under Supreme Court jurisprudence, have the discretion to 
exercise ancillary jurisdiction to expunge criminal records based on solely 
equitable considerations. This Part will first provide a background on a federal 
court’s equitable powers. Second, this Part will examine the different 
expungement statutes at the federal and state levels. Lastly, this Part will review 
federal and state court approaches to expunging records when there is a 
constitutional violation.  
A. Equitable Powers 
A federal court’s equitable powers stem from the “principles of the system 
of judicial remedies” of the English Court of Chancery.60 The Court of Chancery 
was only allowed to exercise its equitable powers when there was not an 
adequate common law remedy for a claimant.61 This equitable power for federal 
courts in the United States is embedded in Article III, Section 2 of the 
Constitution.62 Article III, Section 2 grants federal courts jurisdiction over cases 
or controversies in “law and equity.”63 Similar to the Court of Chancery in 
England, a federal court in the United States is only allowed to hear a case in 
equity when no “adequate and complete remedy may be had at law.”64  
Because a court may exercise equity jurisdiction when there are no adequate 
remedies at law, a court may only sit in equity in limited circumstances. In other 
words, as Alexander Hamilton wrote, “[t]he great and primary use of a court of 
equity is to give relief in extraordinary cases, which are exceptions to the general 
rules.”65 Today, like the English chancery court, a federal court exercises its 
equity jurisdiction only in exceptional cases.66 Examples of these scenarios 
include where a claimant, inter alia, seeks to enjoin or force another party to act 
in a specified manner by way of injunction or specific performance or attempts 
 
United States v. Allen, 57 F. Supp. 3d 533, 541 (E.D.N.C. 2014) (same).  
 60 Atlas Life Ins. Co. v. W. I. S., Inc., 306 U.S. 563, 568 (1939). 
 61 Michael T. Morley, The Federal Equity Power, 59 B.C. L. REV. 218, 229 (2018). Historically, the Court 
of Chancery found there to be no adequate remedies at law when a party brought an action for “fraud, accident, 
or mistake” as well as other areas where the common law was insufficient. David W. Raack, A History of 
Injunctions in England Before 1700, 61 IND. L.J. 539, 555 (1986). 
 62 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 16, 1 Stat. 73, 82. The Judiciary Act further provided that cases of 
equity were not subject to a trial by jury. Id. § 12, 1 Stat. at 80. 
 65 Morley, supra note 62, at 231 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, at 438 (Alexander Hamilton) (George 
W. Carey & James McClellan eds., 2001)).  
 66 Jurisdiction: Equity, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/courts/jurisdiction-equity (last 
visited Feb. 26, 2020).  
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to gain title to real property against all other potential claimants through quiet 
title.67  
In addition to the strict requirement that a claimant must exhaust all remedies 
at law before a court can administer an equitable remedy, courts will generally 
only administer an equitable remedy in particularized circumstances.68 Such 
circumstances are imperative because the remedies tend to significantly 
implicate the rights of others.69 For example, a plaintiff seeking a permanent 
injunction enjoining a person or entity permanently from doing some act must 
satisfy a stringent four-factor test.70 Under the four-factor test, the plaintiff must 
show:  
(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury;  
(2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are 
inadequate to compensate for that injury;  
(3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and 
defendant a remedy in equity is warranted; and  
(4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent 
injunction.71 
Coupling the stringent inquiries, like that for an injunction, with the preliminary 
requirement of there being no adequate remedy at law, denotes that the chances 
of a litigant succeeding in an equitable action are often low.  
1. A Court Should Only Expunge Criminal Records in Extreme 
Circumstances 
Historically, like any equitable remedy, the expunction of criminal records 
was only granted in limited circumstances.72 As one court noted, “expungement 
is, in fact, an extraordinary remedy and that ‘unwarranted adverse consequences’ 
must be uniquely significant to outweigh the strong public interest in 
 
 67 See Samuel L. Bray, The System of Equitable Remedies, 63 UCLA L. REV. 530, 541–42 (2016) (“The 
equitable remedies still used regularly in the United States are the injunction, specific performance . . . and a 
cluster of restitutionary remedies: accounting for profits . . . and equitable recession.”). 
 68 See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (noting the four-factor test applied 
in injunction actions); Ellis v. Dixie Highway Special Rd. & Bridge Dist., 138 So. 374, 375 (Fla. 1931) (“[A] 
court of equity will give relief in respect of personality and quiet title thereto when, owing to exceptional 
circumstances, there is no adequate remedy at law.”). 
 69 See generally eBay Inc., 547 U.S. at 391 (injunction); King v. Hamilton, 29 U.S. 311, 328 (1830) 
(specific performance of a contract); Ellis, 138 So. at 375–76 (quiet title). 
 70 See, e.g., eBay Inc., 547 U.S. at 391 (noting that this test was “[a]ccording to well-established principles 
of equity”).  
 71 Id.  
 72 See, e.g., United States v. Schnitzer, 567 F.2d 536, 539 (2d Cir. 1977) (stating, absent a federal statute, 
a court may expunge records in “extreme circumstances” based on equitable considerations). 
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maintaining accurate and undoctored records.”73 Despite the issues that criminal 
records may present,74 public policy considerations warrant this stringent 
inquiry for a variety of reasons.75 First, the public has a “common law right of 
access to judicial records.”76 Additionally, the public has a strong interest in 
knowing the potential risks their neighbors may present.77 Similarly, individuals 
engaging in business or in search of a licensed professional have a significant 
interest in being fully informed of the character of the person they are interacting 
with.78  
The expungement of criminal records further presents problems for 
employers and law enforcement.79 The problems presented to employers 
originate from their responsibility for their employee’s actions and their duty to 
hire employees that do not present a threat to others.80 Regarding law 
enforcement practices, the information that accompanies criminal records is also 
instrumental to investigations.81 Information about a prior act may aid in 
identifying a potential criminal by providing insight on the modus operandi of 
the offender and the fingerprint and DNA data imbedded in the record may play 
a crucial role in identification.82  
Expunging criminal records also poses an issue for the judicial system.83 A 
criminal record can only be effectively expunged if the person whose record was 
expunged is allowed to deny that she has been arrested, no matter the occasion.84 
An issue arises, then, when an individual whose record has been expunged is 
called to testify at a public trial, as a character witness for example, and is asked 
if she has ever been arrested.85 Forcing the individual to answer affirmatively 
defeats the purpose of expunging the criminal record in the first place.86 
However, if the individual is allowed to answer in the negative, it is essentially 
 
 73 United States v. Flowers, 389 F.3d 737, 739 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 74 See supra Part I.  
 75 See Dugan, supra note 29, at 1329–30; Yee, supra note 47, at 178–79; Kessler, supra note 13, at 414–
15. 
 76 Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978).  
 77 See Dugan, supra note 29, at 1329–30; Yee, supra note 47, at 178–79.  
 78 See James W. Diehm, Federal Expungement: A Concept in Need of a Definition, 66 ST. JOHNS L. REV. 
73, 76–77 (1992); Dugan, supra note 29, at 1329–30; Yee, supra note 47, at 178–79.  
 79 See Diehm, supra note 79, at 77; Kessler, supra note 13, at 414.  
 80 See Kessler, supra note 13, at 414.  
 81 Diehm, supra note 79, at 77. 
 82 Id.; see also DNA Sample Collection from Arrestees, NAT’L INST. JUST. (Dec. 6, 2012), https://www.nij. 
gov/topics/forensics/evidence/dna/pages/collection-from-arrestees.aspx.  
 83 See Diehm, supra note 79, at 76. 
 84 See id.  
 85 See id.  
 86 See id.  
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court-sponsored perjury.87 This grey area accompanying the expunging of 
criminal records has the potential to be extremely difficult for a judge to navigate 
through. In balancing the public interest and the interest of the person with the 
record, this ambiguity favors the public interest and cuts against the arguments 
for expunging criminal records.  
B. Expungement Statutes 
Another basis on which a court may derive the power to expunge criminal 
records is an express legislative grant.88 However, currently no general 
expungement statutes exist at the federal or state level allowing a court to 
expunge records on the basis of fundamental fairness.89 In light of the 
encumbering consequences faced by individuals with criminal records, there has 
been a substantial amount of scholarship pressuring Congress and state 
legislatures to pass a general expungement statute.90 Much of this scholarship 
maintains that Congress and state legislatures are better-equipped than the courts 
to provide for the expungement of criminal records.91 
This Section will first discuss the few federal statutes that grant federal 
courts the power to expunge criminal records. Second, this Section will expound 
upon the variety of approaches to expungement taken by state legislatures as 
well as examine the different views adopted by state courts on their authority to 
expunge records.  
1. Federal Statutes  
Although Congress has not passed a general expungement statute, it has 
passed a few statutes that grant courts the power to expunge records in specific 
circumstances.92 The three premier statutes that provide for the expunging of 
records concern (1) DNA records of a person after their military conviction is 
 
 87 See id. But see Kessler, supra note 13, at 446 (“Expungement law is not an effort to rewrite history, but 
‘reflects the fact that past convictions followed by a lengthy period of law-abiding conduct simply are not 
relevant in predicting future criminal activity or assessing credibility.’”).  
 88 See, e.g., Diehm, supra note 79, at 80.  
 89 Id.; Kessler, supra note 13, at 427–29. 
 90 See generally Diehm, supra note 78, at 102–06 (arguing that a federal statute on expungement “will 
eliminate many of the uncertainties that now exist” on the issue of whether federal courts have the to expunge 
criminal records); Yee, supra note 47, at 188 (asserting there should be a “comprehensive statute”); Kessler, 
supra note 13, at 428–29 (urging state legislatures to pass expungement statutes).  
 91 See Diehm, supra note 79, at 102–06; see also Kessler, supra note 13, at 431–33. 
 92 13 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, EDWARD H. COOPER & RICHARD D. FREER, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3523.2 (3d ed. 2008) [hereinafter 13 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE].  
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overturned;93 (2) certain FBI DNA records of a person after her conviction is 
overturned;94 and (3) records of persons under the age of twenty-one convicted 
under Section 404 of the Controlled Substances Act.95  
These statutes suggest that Congress engaged in a balancing of public policy 
interests with fundamental fairness to the individuals with records.96 Although 
Congress is not currently entertaining the idea of a general expungement 
statute,97 these three statutes do provide Congress with a potential framework to 
pass a more comprehensive statute in the future. The Second Circuit noted these 
statutes and conspicuously hinted to Congress that it might want to consider a 
more comprehensive approach:98 “[T]hat the District Court had no authority to 
expunge records of a valid conviction in this case says nothing about Congress’s 
ability to provide jurisdiction in similar cases . . . . Congress has done so in other 
contexts. It might consider doing so again . . . .”99 
2. State Statutes 
While Congress has not addressed the expunging of criminal records outside 
of the limited circumstances stated above, state expungement provisions vary 
greatly.100 For crimes other than misdemeanors and petty offenses,101 some 
states, much like Congress, provide little to no opportunity for the expungement 
of records.102 Conversely, other state legislatures, such as Alabama and 
Maryland, have passed statutes that contain provisions for the automatic 
expungement of arrest records for certain felonies, where the charges were 
dropped, dismissed, or the person was acquitted.103 Moreover, several state 
legislatures have enacted statutes that allow for the expungement of convictions 
for a variety of crimes and some further permit expungement after the 
 
 93 10 U.S.C. § 1565(e) (2012).  
 94 34 U.S.C. §12592(d) (2012).  
 95 18 U.S.C. § 3607(c) (2012). 
 96 See supra notes 73–88 and accompanying text. 
 97 There is one bill currently in the House Judiciary Committee that, if passed, would grant a federal court 
the authority to expunge criminal records for non-violent offenders under certain conditions. Expungement Act 
of 2017, H.R. 3578, 115th Cong. (2017).  
 98 Doe v. United States, 833 F.3d 192, 199 (2d Cir. 2016). 
 99 Id.  
 100 See generally 50-State Comparison: Judicial Expungement, Sealing, and Set-Aside, RESTORATION 
RTS. PROJECT (Dec. 2019), http://ccresourcecenter.org/state-restoration-profiles/50-state-comparisonjudicial-
expungement-sealing-and-set-aside/. 
 101 Wurie, supra note 13, at 41 (noting at the state and local level, “misdemeanors and petty offenses are 
relatively easy to get expunged”).  
 102 Kessler, supra note 13, at 417–18. For a comprehensive list of the different approaches states take, see 
50-State Comparison, supra note 101. 
 103 Kessler, supra note 13, at 417–18, 418 n.123 (discussing Alabama and Maryland statutes). 
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completion of rehabilitation programs.104 Although state legislatures do 
generally provide more guidance than Congress, there still is a significant lack 
of statutory authority in the area of expungement that is begging to be filled.105 
This void leaves the opportunity for state courts to fill it. However, just as 
state statutes vary greatly, state courts, absent statutory authorization, also vary 
regarding their power to expunge criminal records.106 A number of state courts 
have held they do not have the authority to expunge records without express 
authorization from a state legislature, because doing so would violate separation 
of powers.107 Nevertheless, the state courts that agree that expunging records 
would raise a separation of powers issue disagree over which branch is being 
encroached upon.108  
Other courts take a different view. A handful of courts assert, absent 
statutory authority, that they have the inherent power to expunge criminal 
records.109 In Pennsylvania, for example, the supreme court asserted this 
inherent power and explained that “there is a long-standing right,” rooted in due 
process, to petition the court to exercise its discretion to expunge a criminal 
record.110 Nonetheless, in the spirit of ambiguity and a lack of conformity, some 
courts have refused to fully address the issue.111 
 
 104 See 50-State Comparison, supra note 101. 
 105 See generally id.  
 106 Kessler, supra note 13, at 417–18. 
 107 See Commonwealth v. Jones, 406 S.W.3d 857, 861 (Ky. 2013); Stanton v. State, 686 P.2d 587, 589 
(Wyo. 1984). Federal courts, however, have not traditionally viewed separation of powers as a barrier to 
expunging records. Diehm, supra note 79, at 80. But see United States v. Lucido, 612 F.3d 871, 877 (6th Cir. 
2010) (“[O]ne person’s equitable power is another person’s authority to remake federal law and to cross serious 
separation-of-power divides in the process.”).  
 108 See, e.g., Jones, 406 S.W.3d at 861 (holding that where a statute does not provide for expungement, it 
would encroach upon legislative power for a court to expunge criminal records); Stanton, 686 P.2d at 589 
(holding a court cannot expunge criminal records without statutory authority because doing so would encroach 
upon the pardon power of the governor). 
 109 See Mulkey v. Purdy, 234 So. 2d 108, 111 (Fla. 1970) (holding a court may retain jurisdiction to 
expunge records in cases of “overriding equitable considerations”); Commonwealth v. Moto, 23 A.3d 989, 991 
(Pa. 2011) (noting the trial court’s discretion to expunge arrest records); In re A.N.T., 798 S.E.2d 623, 626 (W. 
Va. 2017) (maintaining there are two potential bases of authority for expunging records: (1) statutory grant and 
(2) the courts inherent power). 
 110 Moto, 23 A.3d at 993. 
 111 See Farmer v. State, 235 P.3d 1012, 1014–15 (Alaska 2010). In Farmer, the court noted that on a 
previous occasion the court dodged resolving the issue of whether a trial court has inherent authority to expunge 
records. Id. at 1014. Likewise, here the court refused to resolve the issue and held “even if Alaska courts do have 
inherent authority to expunge . . . this case does not present circumstances that would justify expungement.” Id. 
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C. Violations of the Constitution 
The Constitution is the third and final potential authority for a court to 
expunge criminal records. Courts appear have the authority to expunge criminal 
records to remedy an arrest or conviction that was in violation of the 
Constitution.112 Constitutional violations are the one area where both federal and 
state courts agree that their authority to expunge records is substantiated.113 This 
is not to be conflated or confused with the argument that there is a constitutional 
right to expungement.114 This Section will first discuss the approach used in 
federal courts and then discuss the approach used in state courts.  
1. Federal Courts 
In the federal system, there is a semblance of a general agreement that a court 
retains the authority to expunge arrest records if the arrest or conviction violated 
the Constitution or a federal statute.115 There is an expansive amount of case law 
where courts have refused to expunge records because the petitioner did not 
allege that the arrest or conviction was illegal.116 However, there is a paucity of 
case law illustrating situations where courts have, in fact, granted a petition for 
the expungement of criminal records on the basis of a constitutional violation. 
Nevertheless, courts repeatedly appear to reserve this power on bases such as 
“the defendant filed a motion in the original criminal case seeking expungement 
 
 112 Infra note 117 and accompanying text.  
 113 See, e.g., United States v. Wahi, 850 F.3d 296, 303 (7th Cir. 2017); United States v. Field, 756 F.3d 
911, 915–16 (6th Cir. 2014); United States v. Coloian, 480 F.3d 47, 49 n.4 (1st Cir. 2007); United States v. 
Meyer, 439 F.3d 855, 861–62 (8th Cir. 2006); Farmer, 250 P.3d at 1015; State v. S.L.H., 755 N.W.2d 271, 274 
(Minn. 2008); In re A.N.T., 798 S.E.2d at 626–28. 
 114 See Sealed Appellant v. Sealed Appellee, 130 F.3d 695, 699 (5th Cir. 1997) (“There is no constitutional 
basis for a ‘right to expungement.’”); United States v. Johnson, 714 F. Supp. 522, 523 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (“[T]he 
right to the expungement of a criminal record is not a federal constitutional right.”).  
 115 See Field, 756 F.3d at 915–16; Coloian, 480 F.3d at 49 n.4; Meyer, 439 F.3d at 861–62. 
 116 See Wahi, 850 F.3d at 303 (“Expungement authority must . . . have a source in the Constitution or 
statutes.”); Field, 756 F.3d at 915–16 (assuming that a federal court has the authority to expunge criminal records 
when there was a violation of the constitution); Coloian, 480 F.3d at 49 n.4 (denying the petitioner’s 
expungement application because he did not seek expungement under a federal statute nor for a violation of the 
Constitution); United States v. Rowlands, 451 F.3d 173, 177–78 (3d Cir. 2006) (noting that a court has the 
inherent authority to expunge records to preserve “basic legal rights” (quoting United States v. McMains, 540 
F.2d 387, 389–90 (8th Cir. 1976))); Meyer, 439 F.3d at 861–62 (refusing to assert jurisdiction over the 
petitioner’s expungement application because he did not allege there was a violation of a federal statute or the 
Constitution); United States v. Sumner, 226 F.3d 1005, 1014 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[A] district court’s ancillary 
jurisdiction is limited to expunging the record of an unlawful arrest or conviction, or to correcting a clerical 
error.”). But see Rogers v. Slaughter, 469 F.2d 1084, 1084–85 (5th Cir. 1972) (reversing the district courts 
expunction of the defendant’s records where the defendant was not advised of his right to counsel).  
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of his record[] . . . but did not allege any unlawful arrest or other legal 
infirmity.”117  
The courts that have expunged arrest records for illegal arrests or convictions 
have done so in a narrow set of egregious circumstances.118 One court ordered 
the expungement of arrest records of innocent individuals swept up in a mass 
arrest, without a proper showing of probable cause, during a protest about the 
U.S. military activity in Southeast Asia.119 Another court ordered expungement 
of the arrest and conviction records of African Americans who were prosecuted 
in an attempt to discourage them from exercising their right to vote.120 A third 
court expunged the criminal records of an individual’s conviction after the 
government had “destroyed” evidence of entrapment.121 These decisions 
strongly represent the tradition of federal courts expunging criminal records only 
under the most extraordinary circumstances, even when it comes to a 
constitutional violation.122  
2. State Courts 
Similar to how state courts take a wide variety of approaches when it comes 
to their power to expunge criminal records absent the express statutory 
authority,123 they also differ in their views of their authority to act when there is 
a constitutional violation. A number of state courts take a similar approach to 
 
 117 United States v. Haslett, No. 2:83–cr–37–1, 2009 WL 819004, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 26, 2009) 
(summarizing Sumner, 226 F.3d at 1014–15).  
 118 See Sullivan v. Murphy, 478 F.2d 938, 971 (D.C. Cir. 1973); United States v. McLeod, 385 F.2d 734, 
750 (5th Cir. 1967); United States v. Benlizar, 459 F. Supp. 614, 624–25 (D.D.C. 1978).  
 119 Sullivan, 478 F.2d at 971; see also Urban v. Breier, 401 F. Supp. 706, 713 (E.D. Wis. 1975) (ordering 
the records of fifty-four suspect members of a known motorcycle gang to be expunged because they were 
arrested without probable cause); Kowall v. United States, 53 F.R.D. 211, 214–16 (W.D. Mich. 1971) 
(expunging records of an arrest under a statute that was later held unconstitutional).  
 120 McLeod, 385 F.2d at 750. 
 121 Benlizar, 459 F. Supp. at 624–25 (holding that the government conduct was “reprehensible” and 
expunged the defendant’s criminal record). 
 122 There is an interesting strand of case law in the Sixth Circuit that maintains, in response to a habeas 
petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (2012), a federal court has the authority to expunge state criminal convictions. 
E.g., Gentry v. Deuth, 456 F.3d 687, 696–97 (6th Cir. 2006). In Gentry, the petitioner filed a habeas petition 
alleging that in her conviction her Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause rights were violated. Id. at 690–91. 
The district court granted the petitioner’s request and nullified her conviction. Id. at 691. On appeal, the Sixth 
Circuit ordered the expungement of the petitioner’s state criminal record. Id. at 696–97. The court held “the law 
is absolutely clear that the writ releases the successful petitioner from the states custody . . . relief from the 
collateral consequences of an unconstitutionally obtained state criminal conviction effectively requires 
expungement of the conviction from the petitioner’s record.” Id. However, the relief granted by the court in 
Gentry was not total. The nullification of the petitioner’s conviction did not preclude the Commonwealth from 
retrying the petitioner. Id. at 697.  
 123 See supra note 107 and accompanying text.  
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federal courts and will only expunge criminal records when there has been an 
unlawful arrest or conviction.124 One court noted that “courts ‘may order 
expunction in cases where there has been an unlawful arrest, where an arrest has 
been made merely for harassment purposes, or where the statute under which an 
individual was prosecuted has subsequently been determined to be 
unconstitutional.’”125 
A Texas appellate court, on the other hand, took a markedly different 
approach from the majority of courts.126 The Texas court viewed expungement 
as neither a constitutional nor a common law issue.127 Instead, the court believed 
the sole judicial authority to expunge criminal records was created by statute.128 
Although a Texas statute provides for the expungement of records in an array of 
circumstances,129 Texas courts lack the flexibility to equitably expunge records 
not covered in the statute.  
Other courts have taken a more novel approach. These state courts, in 
response to expungement petitions, hold that in some circumstances, public 
access to criminal records violates an individual’s right to privacy and thus, the 
court will expunge the individual’s records.130 Under this approach, a court 
expunged the records of a domestic violence civil protection order where 
charges were never filed.131 The court conducted a balancing test, based on the 
constitutional right to privacy, that weighed “the interest of the accused in his 
good name and right to be free from unwarranted punishment against the 
legitimate need of government to maintain records.”132 In balancing, the court 
 
 124 Farmer v. State, 235 P.3d 1012, 1015 (Alaska 2010); State v. S.L.H., 755 N.W.2d 271, 274 (Minn. 
2008); In re A.N.T., 798 S.E.2d 623, 628 (W. Va. 2017); see also State v. Howe, 308 N.W.2d 743, 748–49 (N.D. 
1981) (holding that courts have the “obligation” to expunge the records of someone that was unlawfully 
arrested).  
 125 Farmer, 235 P.3d at 1015 (quoting United States v. G., 774 F.2d 1392, 1394 (9th Cir. 1985)).  
 126 See Ex parte Ammons, 550 S.W.3d 235, 237 (Tex. Ct. App. 2018).  
 127 Id. (quoting Ex parte Myers, 24 S.W.3d 477, 480 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000)).  
 128 Id. (referring to TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 55.01 (West 2017)). 
 129 See generally TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 55.01 (West 2017).  
 130 Davidson v. Dill, 503 P.2d 157, 161 (Colo. 1972) (en banc); Schussheim v. Schussheim, 998 N.E.2d 
446, 448 (Ohio 2013) (noting a basis of authority to expunge criminal records is the right to privacy).  
 131 Schussheim, 998 N.E.2d at 449–50. 
 132 Id. at 449 (quoting City of Piper Pike v. Doe, 421 N.E.2d 1303, 1306 (Ohio 1981), overruled on other 
grounds by State v. Radcliff, 28 N.E.3d 69 (Ohio 2015)). A similar balancing test was adopted in Davidson, 503 
P.2d at 161. In this case, the Colorado Supreme Court reversed and remanded a lower court’s decision to dismiss, 
for failure to state a claim, an individual’s petition to expunge her criminal records. Id. at 158. The supreme 
court ordered the lower court to balance “the state’s interest in efficient law enforcement procedures as against 
a particular citizen’s right to be let alone.” Id. at 162–63.  
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found that the petitioner’s interest “outweigh[ed] the legitimate need of the 
government to maintain records.”133  
Although the right to privacy argument has largely been rejected by federal 
courts,134 the balancing tests these courts employ provide a useful framework 
for federal courts, sitting in equity, and legislatures, state and federal, to 
construct a general expungement statute. Moreover, these tests are not that 
distinct from the test for injunctions noted above.135 Stressing and balancing the 
interests of the party petitioning for expungement with the government’s 
interests in protecting the public provides a court with the flexibility necessary 
to grant relief in the appropriate circumstances.136 
III. OVERVIEW OF ANCILLARY JURISDICTION AND THE 
KOKKONEN DECISION 
As discussed above, the consequences of an arrest or criminal record, in 
some respects, has the real potential to be a scarlet letter. There is a glaring need 
for a mechanism that, in limited circumstances, provides an individual with a 
record the opportunity to have that record expunged for considerations of equity 
and fundamental fairness alone. Under the current state of the law, the doctrine 
of ancillary enforcement jurisdiction should provide courts with an avenue to 
equitably expunge criminal records. This Part will first provide a definition of 
ancillary jurisdiction along with a brief history of the doctrine. Second, this Part 
gives an overview of the circumstances in which ancillary jurisdiction has 
traditionally been asserted. Third, this Part will review the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance Co. of America. Finally, this 
Part will analyze case law the Court relied upon in setting forth the two-pronged 
ancillary jurisdiction inquiry.  
A. Ancillary Jurisdiction  
“[F]ederal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.”137 A federal court may 
properly assert jurisdiction only if the court has subject matter jurisdiction.138 
This jurisdiction is limited to two potential sources: (1) the Constitution or (2) a 
 
 133 Schussheim, 998 N.E.2d at 449. 
 134 See, e.g., Nilson v. Layton City, 45 F.3d 369, 372 (10th Cir. 1995) (“[G]overnment disclosures of arrest 
records, judicial proceedings, and information contained in police reports do not implicate the right to privacy.” 
(citations omitted)). 
 135 Supra note 72 and accompanying text.  
 136 For a suggested ten-factor balancing test, see Kessler, supra note 13, at 436. 
 137 Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 374 (1978).  
 138 13 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 92, § 3523. 
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federal statute.139 Once a case invokes the court’s jurisdiction,140 however, a 
federal court has the authority to hear actions that are ancillary to the original 
case.141 These “ancillary” proceedings, on their own, do not need to invoke a 
federal courts original jurisdiction.142  
The ancillary jurisdiction doctrine developed with an eye towards protecting 
the interests of both parties and nonparties from infringement by any individual 
that has invoked a court’s jurisdiction.143 Accordingly, one of the chief focuses 
of ancillary jurisdiction is to allow a court to give complete relief between the 
parties and to avoid duplicative or piecemeal litigation.144 In an attempt to codify 
ancillary jurisdiction, Congress enacted a statute that labeled ancillary 
jurisdiction as “supplemental jurisdiction.”145 The language of the statute grants 
a federal court the authority to entertain “all claims that are so related to claims 
in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same 
case or controversy.”146  
Although Congress codified part of what was recognized as ancillary 
jurisdiction, a common law version of ancillary jurisdiction—or “ancillary 
enforcement jurisdiction”—still exists.147 Quoting a leading treatise, the Fourth 
Circuit delineated between what was codified in the supplemental jurisdiction 
statute and what remained in the common law version.148 The court stated, 
 
 139 Id.  
 140 See 13E CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & 
PROCEDURE §§ 3601–3610 (3d ed. 2008) [hereinafter 13E FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE] (diversity of 
citizenship) and 13D CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, EDWARD H. COOPER, RICHARD D. FREER, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE §§ 3561–3566 (3d ed. 2008) [hereinafter 13D FEDERAL PRACTICE & 
PROCEDURE] (federal question) for a comprehensive discussion of a federal court’s subject matter jurisdiction. 
 141 Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 239 (1934).  
 142 Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1976); 13 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 92, 
§ 3523.2. 
 143 See Exxon Mobile Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 579 (2005) (“Ancillary jurisdiction 
evolved primarily to protect defending parties, or others whose rights might be adversely affected if they could 
not air their claims in an ongoing federal action.”); United States v. Mettetal, 714 Fed. App’x 230, 234 (4th Cir. 
2017) (same). 
 144 George B. Fraser, Ancillary Jurisdiction and the Joinder of Claims in the Federal Courts, 33 F.R.D. 
27, 27 (1964).  
 145 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2012); see 13 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 92, § 3523.2. 
 146 § 1367(a). The excerpt quoted above pertains to federal question actions. When the action invoking 
federal jurisdiction is in diversity, Congress has carved out certain situations where a federal court may not 
exercise supplemental jurisdiction. See § 1367(b). These carve outs include “claims by plaintiffs against persons 
made parties under Rule 14 [(interpleader)], 19 [(necessary parties)], 20 [(permissive joinder)], or 24 
[(intervention)] of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or over claims by persons proposed to be joined as 
plaintiffs under Rule 19 of such rules, or seeking to intervene as plaintiffs under Rule 24 of such rules . . . .” Id.  
 147 13 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 92, § 3523.2 (explaining that it is “clear” that this 
version of ancillary jurisdiction was not altered by the passage of the supplemental jurisdiction statute).  
 148 Robb Evans & Assocs., LLC v. Holibaugh, 609 F.3d 359, 363 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting 13 FEDERAL 
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“[a]lthough § 1367 governs ancillary jurisdiction over claims asserted in a case 
. . . it does not affect common law ancillary jurisdiction ‘over related 
proceedings that are technically separate from the initial case that invoked 
federal subject matter jurisdiction,’ which remains governed by case law.”149 In 
other words, the supplemental jurisdiction statute applies to individual claims in 
a case, whereas common law ancillary jurisdiction applies to the controversy 
more generally.150  
B. Traditional Exercises of Ancillary Jurisdiction  
A traditional manner in which ancillary jurisdiction had been asserted, 
codified in the supplemental jurisdiction statute,151 is over related claims that 
themselves do not invoke the subject matter jurisdiction of a federal court.152 
Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange is thought by scholars to be a substantial 
expansion of this doctrine.153 Prior to the Court’s decision in Moore, ancillary 
jurisdiction, according to the Supreme Court case law, could only be asserted if 
it related to “property or assets actually or constructively drawn into the courts 
possession or control by the principal suit.”154 Conversely, after Moore, for a 
court to have the authority over an ancillary claim it only need to arise out of the 
event that precipitated the original action.155 
This exercise of ancillary jurisdiction, codified in the supplemental 
jurisdiction statute, is distinct from the common law ancillary jurisdiction, or 
ancillary enforcement jurisdiction, doctrine which has survived the passage of 
the supplemental jurisdiction statute.156 The ancillary enforcement jurisdiction 
doctrine gives courts authority over “related proceedings,”157 which courts have 
 
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 92, § 3523.2); see Peacock v. Thomas, 516 U.S. 349, 354 n.5 (1996) (noting 
that “much of,” but not all, the common law ancillary jurisdiction doctrine was codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1367). 
 149 See Robb Evans & Assocs., 609 F.3d at 363 (quoting 13 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 
92, § 3523.2 (emphasis in original)); see also Borough of W. Mifflin v. Lancaster, 45 F.3d 780, 784 (3d Cir. 
1995) (recognizing that the supplemental jurisdiction statute codified “some forms of ‘ancillary jurisdiction’”).  
 150 See Robb Evans & Assocs., 609 F.3d at 363.  
 151 See 13 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 92, § 3523.2. 
 152 See, e.g., Sandlin v. Corp. Interiors Inc., 972 F.2d 1212, 1215–16 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding that a 
district court may exercise ancillary jurisdiction “over certain cross-claims, counter claims and third-party claims 
that are related to the principle case”); Great Lakes Rubber Corp. v. Herbert Cooper Co., 286 F.2d 631, 633 (3d 
Cir. 1961) (citing Moore v. N.Y. Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593, 607–09 (1926)).  
 153 See, e.g., 13 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 92, § 3523 (noting that the Moore holding 
was a “major expansion” of the ancillary jurisdiction doctrine).  
 154 See 13 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 92, § 3523.2 n.10. 
 155 Moore, 270 U.S. at 610. 
 156 See 13 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 92, § 3523.2. 
 157 Robb Evans & Assocs., LLC v. Holibaugh, 609 F.3d 359, 363 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting 13 FEDERAL 
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 92, § 3523.2).  
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exercised in a variety of circumstances. One scenario where a federal court 
retains enforcement jurisdiction, or has “inherent authority” to act, is to 
implement the court’s orders.158 This authority allows a federal court to cast a 
wide net over proceedings related to the original action, including over 
proceedings involving a third party.159  
For example, in Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, a bankruptcy court order discharged 
the respondent “from all provable debts.”160 Subsequently, the petitioner, to 
whom the respondent owed money, filed an action in state court to recover the 
money that he loaned to the respondent.161 In response, the respondent returned 
to the bankruptcy court that had discharged him from his debts and pled the court 
to enjoin the petitioner from pursuing the state court action.162 The bankruptcy 
court sided with the respondent and the petitioner appealed, claiming that the 
bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction to preclude him from asserting a claim in 
state court.163 Ultimately, on appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the bankruptcy 
court’s ruling.164 The Supreme Court reasoned that, because the bankruptcy 
court was acting “in aid of and to effectuate [an] adjudication” previously 
rendered, the bankruptcy court retained the authority to enjoin the defendant 
from pursuing the state court action.165  
In addition to implementing a court order against a third party, courts may 
exercise ancillary enforcement jurisdiction to resolve disputes between attorneys 
and their clients.166 A court has jurisdiction to entertain these disputes despite 
 
 158 See generally Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 379–80 (1994) (holding that 
ancillary jurisdiction has typically been asserted to “effectuate” the courts judgments); Chambers v. NASCO, 
Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 46 (1991) (sanctioning a party for bad-faith conduct through the court’s inherent authority to 
“vindicat[e] [its] judicial authority”); Universal Oil Prod. Co. v. Root Ref. Co., 328 U.S. 575, 580 (1946) (noting 
it is unquestionable that a federal court has the inherent power “to investigate whether a judgment was obtained 
by fraud” (citing Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 248–49 (1944))); Local Loan Co. 
v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 239 (1934) (holding a federal court retains jurisdiction to enforce its orders to “preserve 
the fruits and advantages of a judgment or decree rendered”).  
 159 See, e.g., Peacock v. Thomas, 516 U.S. 349, 356–57 (1996). According to the Court, the proceedings 
involving third parties “includ[e] attachment, mandamus, garnishment, and the prejudicial avoidance of 
fraudulent conveyances.” Id.  
 160 Local Loan Co., 292 U.S. at 238.  
 161 Id.  
 162 Id.  
 163 Id.  
 164 Id. at 245.  
 165 Id. at 239–42.  
 166 See, e.g., K.C. ex rel. Erica C. v. Torlakson, 762 F.3d 963, 968 (9th Cir. 2014) (explaining that there is 
“no debate” a federal court has ancillary jurisdiction, even after the litigation has ended, “over attorney fee 
disputes collateral to the underlying litigation” (quoting Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Ferrante, 364 F.3d 1037, 
1041 (9th Cir. 2004))); Levitt v. Brooks, 669 F.3d 100, 102–03 (2d Cir. 2012) (noting that it is “well settled” a 
federal court may hear fee disputes (quoting Chesley v. Union Carbide Corp., 927 F.2d 60, 64 (2d Cir. 1991))); 
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the notion that these proceedings are entirely separate from the proceeding that 
initially invoked the court’s jurisdiction.167 Furthermore, these proceedings are 
usually governed by state contract law, not by federal law.168 A prime example 
of a court entertaining an attorney-client dispute is the Second Circuit’s decision 
in Levitt v. Brooks.169 
In Levitt, an accused criminal defendant ran out of funds and ceased paying 
his attorney’s bills during his trial.170 The attorney therefore moved for the 
district court to require the criminal defendant to pay his fee.171 On appeal, the 
appellate court held that the district court did not err in asserting ancillary 
jurisdiction.172 The court reasoned that the district court had ancillary 
enforcement jurisdiction to effectively manage the case by “ensur[ing] 
defendant does not become indigent and that he has representation throughout 
the proceedings.”173 
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit has held that a district court has jurisdiction 
over attorney’s fees disputes even when the underlying case is moot.174 In 
Zucker v. Occidental Petroleum Co. there was a dispute over the amount of 
attorney’s fees the plaintiffs’ attorney was to receive in an approved class action 
settlement.175 The plaintiffs’ attorneys argued that the district court did not have 
the jurisdiction to revise the award of attorney’s fees granted in the settlement 
agreement because the case was moot.176 The Ninth Circuit held that the district 
court had the authority to alter the award of attorney’s fees because the “district 
court retains equitable jurisdiction even when the underlying case is moot” 
because its jurisdiction “outlasts the case or controversy.”177 
 
see also Torres v. O’Quinn, 612 F.3d 237, 241 n.1 (4th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he continuing collection of appellants 
filing fees is ancillary to the court’s original jurisdiction over Torres’s appeals . . . .”).  
 167 E.g., Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 395–96 (1990) (citing White v. N.H. Dep’t of 
Emp’t Sec., 455 U.S. 445, 451 n.13 (1982)).  
 168 E.g., Novinger v. E.I. Dupont Nemours & Co., 809 F.2d 212, 217 (3d Cir. 1987) (“Attorneys’ fee 
arrangements . . . are matters primarily of state contract law.”).  
 169 Levitt, 669 F.3d at 101–03. 
 170 Id. at 102–03. 
 171 Id. at 102. The court also noted there is a consensus that a court has ancillary jurisdiction to resolve fee 
disputes when it is relevant to the “main action.” Id. at 103 (quoting Chesley v. Union Carbide Corp., 927 F.2d 
60, 64 (2d Cir. 1991)).  
 172 Id. at 103. 
 173 Id.  
 174 Zucker v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 192 F.3d 1323, 1329 (9th Cir. 1999).  
 175 Id. at 1325. 
 176 Id. at 1325–26, 1329.  
 177 Id. at 1329.  
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These decisions exemplify a court’s utilization of ancillary enforcement 
jurisdiction over collateral proceedings and the potential breadth of the 
doctrine.178 In Local Loan Co., a court was able to enjoin a third party from 
pursuing a separate action in a different court because it was effectuating an 
adjudication.179 Further, the attorney–client disputes in Levitt and Zucker had 
little or nothing to do with the substance of the action that invoked the court’s 
jurisdiction.180 Nonetheless courts routinely exercise their discretion to resolve 
these disputes which are collateral to the original proceeding because “[i]t is well 
established that a federal court may consider collateral issues” and motions for 
attorney’s fees are “supplemental to the original proceeding.”181  
C. The Kokkonen Decision 
Although there are some relatively well-defined areas in which a court may 
exercise the ancillary enforcement jurisdiction that survived the passage of the 
supplemental jurisdiction statute, there is confusion surrounding how far it 
reaches.182 This lack of clarity was acknowledged by the Supreme Court in 
Kokkonen.183 The Court recognized that “[t]he doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction 
can hardly be criticized for being overly rigid or precise,” and attempted to 
provide a narrower definition for when a court may exercise it.184 
In Kokkonen, the parties reached an oral settlement agreement after their 
closing arguments at trial.185 Because they had settled all claims and 
counterclaims, “the parties executed,” and the district judge signed, “a 
Stipulation and Order of Dismissal with Prejudice” f or the claims and the 
 
 178 See Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 238 (1934); Levitt v. Brooks, 669 F.3d 100, 100–04 (2nd 
Cir. 2012); Zucker, 192 F.3d at 1325–29. 
 179 Local Loan Co., 292 U.S. at 239–42. 
 180 Levitt, 669 F.3d at 100–04; Zucker, 192 F.3d at 1325–29. 
 181 Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp. 496 U.S. 384, 395–96 (1990) (quoting Sprague v. Ticonic Nat’l Bank, 
307 U.S. 161, 170 (1939)).  
 182 E.g., Morrow v. District of Columbia, 417 F.2d 728, 739 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (“At least so far as we are 
aware no court has ever tried to fix [the limits of ancillary jurisdiction] with any degree of precision.”); 13 
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, EDWARD H. COOPER, RICHARD D. FREER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & 
PROCEDURE §3523.2 (3rd ed. 2008) (noting that the concept of ancillary jurisdiction has “uncertain limits”); 
Fraser, supra note 145 (observing that the limits of ancillary jurisdiction are “not clear”).  
 183 Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am. 511 U.S. 375, 379 (1994).  
 184 Id. at 379–80. The court stated that prior to Kokkonen, it had only provided “limited description[s]” in 
dicta regarding the scope of ancillary jurisdictions that were “equally inaccurate.” Id. at 378–79 (discussing 
Julian v. Central Trust Co., 193 U.S. 93, 113–14 (1904) and Fulton Nat’l Bank v. Hozier Intervener, 267 U.S. 
276, 280 (1925)). 
 185 Id. at 376–77 
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counterclaims.186 The court’s order, however, neither incorporated nor 
referenced the parties’ settlement agreement in any capacity.187  
Unsurprisingly, a dispute arose concerning the terms of the oral settlement 
agreement.188 As a result, the respondent requested that the district court enforce 
the terms of the settlement agreement, and the petitioner objected, asserting that 
the district court did not have jurisdiction to enforce the agreement because it 
was not referenced in the Court’s order.189 The district court and the court of 
appeals, siding with the respondent, both held that a federal court has the 
“inherent” authority to enforce settlement agreements in a case or controversy 
over which they have original jurisdiction.190 The Supreme Court granted 
certiorari to decide whether the district court had subject matter jurisdiction.191 
As an initial matter, the Supreme Court explained that because the 
respondent was requesting the court to enforce the settlement agreement, and 
not to continue or renew the original suit, the enforcement of the settlement 
agreement “require[d] its own basis for jurisdiction.”192 The respondent, 
however, argued that the court had ancillary jurisdiction over the enforcement 
of the agreement via the dismissal of the original suit, and therefore, the 
agreement did not need to invoke the original jurisdiction of the court.193 To 
buttress its argument, the respondent relied upon language in the Court’s prior 
holding in Julian v. Central Trust Co.194 The Court found that argument 
unpersuasive, explaining that the holding in Julian is not as “permissive” as its 
language suggests because in that case, the court “expressly reserved 
jurisdiction.”195 
 
 186 Id. at 376–77. 
 187 Id. at 377. 
 188 Id. 
 189 Id. 
 190 Id.  
 191 Id. A federal court has original subject matter jurisdiction when it is granted jurisdiction either by (1) 
statute or (2) the constitution. Supra note 140 and accompanying text.  
 192 Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 378.  
 193 Id. at 378. A claim or proceeding need not invoke the courts original jurisdiction if it is ancillary or 
collateral to the original claim invoking the court’s jurisdiction. See Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 10 (1976); 
Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 239 (1934); ; 13 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, EDWARD 
H. COOPER, RICHARD D. FREER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE §3523.2 (3rd ed. 2008). 
 194 Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 378. The language the respondent relied upon was the court’s assertion that “[a] 
bill filed to continue a former litigation in the same court . . . to obtain and secure the fruits, benefits and 
advantages of the proceedings and judgment in a former suit in the same court by the same or additional parties 
. . . or to obtain any equitable relief in regard to, or connected with, or growing out of, any judgment or 
proceeding at law rendered in the same court . . . is an ancillary suit.” Id. (quoting Julian v. Central Trust Co., 
193 U.S. 93, 113–14 (1904)).  
 195 Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 379 (emphasis in original).  
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Accordingly, because the district court did not reserve jurisdiction or 
incorporate the settlement agreement into the order dismissing the claims, the 
court held that the district court did not have ancillary jurisdiction to enforce the 
settlement agreement.196 In reaching its conclusion, the court enumerated what 
came to be the two-pronged inquiry to decide if a court has ancillary 
jurisdiction:197  
Generally speaking, we have asserted ancillary jurisdiction (in the very 
broad sense in which that term is sometimes used) for two separate, 
though sometimes related purposes: (1) to permit disposition by a 
single court of claims that are, in varying respects and degrees 
factually independent . . . and (2) to enable the court to function 
successfully, that is, to manage its proceedings, vindicate its authority, 
and effectuate its decrees. . . .198 
In addressing the first prong, the Court reasoned that the petitioner’s claim 
for breach of the settlement agreement and the respondent’s substantive claim 
which had invoked jurisdiction “have nothing to do with each other.”199 Because 
of this lack of interconnectedness, the Court held that ancillary jurisdiction could 
not be invoked under the first prong.200 In analyzing second prong, the Supreme 
Court found the fact that the district court did not expressly reserve jurisdiction 
over settlement agreement to be dispositive.201 The Court explained the because 
 
 196 Id. at 381. Because the district court could not assert ancillary jurisdiction and therefore the respondents 
claim was, in effect, simply a breach of contract claim, the court held that the settlement agreement had to be 
enforced through the state court system. Id. Up until this point in time there was a circuit split as to whether a 
court retained ancillary jurisdiction to enforce a settlement agreement that was not incorporated into the court’s 
order dismissing the action. Compare Sawka v. Healtheast, Inc., 989 F.2d 138, 141 (3rd Cir. 1993) (holding a 
district court does not have jurisdiction to enforce an unincorporated settlement agreement), and Fairfax 
Countywide Citizens Ass’n v. Cty. Of Fairfax, 571 F.2d 1299, 1303 (4th Cir. 1978) (same), and Langley v. 
Jackson St. Univ., 14 F.3d 1070, 1074–75 (5th Cir. 1994) (same), Adduono v. World Hockey Ass’n 824 F.2d 
617, 621–22 (8th Cir. 1987) (same), and McCall-Bey v. Franzen, 777 F.2d 1178, 1189–90 (7th Cir. 1985) 
(requiring explicit retention of jurisdiction), with Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. 92-11628, 
1993 WL 164884, at *1 (9th Cir. May 18, 1993) (holding the district court had the ‘inherent power” to enforce 
the settlement agreement despite it not being incorporated into the order dismissing the action), and Dankese v. 
Defense Logistics Agency 693 F.2d 13, 16 (1st Cir. 1982) (holding, without specifying if the agreement must 
be incorporated into the order, that the trial court retains authority to “enforce settlement agreements entered 
into by parties . . . before the court”), and Aro Corp. v. Allied Witan Co., 531 F.2d 1368, 1371 (6th Cir. 1976) 
(same), and Kent v. Baker, 815 F.2d 1395, 1398–1400 (11th Cir. 1987) (same).  
 197 Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 379–80.  
 198 Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 379–80 (citing United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. 32, 34 (1812); 13 CHARLES 
ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, EDWARD H. COOPER, RICHARD D. FREER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & 
PROCEDURE §3523 (3rd ed. 2008)).  
 199 Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 380.  
 200 Id.  
 201 Id. at 380–81. The court additionally noted that the district court could have retained jurisdiction by 
incorporating the agreement into the order of dismissal or by including a provision specifically “retaining 
jurisdiction.” Id. at 381  
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the district court did not include the settlement agreement in the order, it could 
hardly be claimed that enforcing the settlement agreement would be “require[d] 
in order [for a court] to perform their functions.”202 Because jurisdiction was not 
supported by either prong, the Court held that the district court improperly 
asserted jurisdiction.203 
Although the two prongs of Kokkonen provide more clarity and structure to 
the ancillary jurisdiction analysis, in enumerating these prongs, the court used 
rather ambiguous language.204 For example, in introducing the two prongs, the 
court stated, “Generally speaking, we have asserted ancillary jurisdiction (in the 
very broad sense in which that term is sometimes used) for two separate, though 
sometimes related purposes. . . .”205 On its face, it seems clear that the Court was 
not intending to set out an entirely new standard for ancillary jurisdiction, nor 
was the court attempting to establish concrete outer limits of the doctrine.206 The 
court left the outer limits of ancillary jurisdiction to be decided on a case-by-
case basis. The Second Circuit, citing Kokkonen, recognized the remaining 
ambiguity in a 2006 decision: “[T]he boundaries of ancillary jurisdiction are not 
easily defined and the cases addressing it are hardly a model of clarity.”207 
D. The Two Prongs of Kokkonen 
The Kokkonen decision added some clarity to the murky ancillary 
enforcement jurisdiction doctrine, but besides the enforcement of settlement 
agreements and the exact language of the prongs, the Supreme Court provided 
little guidance on how far each of the prongs extend.208 Moreover, the Court did 
not create a test or set out factors to determine whether a claim or proceeding 
falls under either of the two prongs.209 What the Court did do, however, was 
plant citations at the tail end of each factor in what seems to be an attempt to 
impart some guidance on the scope of the test.210 This Section will, in turn, 
examine the case law the Court cited after each prong.  
The first prong in the Kokkonen inquiry authorizes a federal court to assert 
ancillary jurisdiction to “permit disposition by a single court of claims that are, 
 
 202 Id.  
 203 Id. at 381. 
 204 Id. at 379–80.  
 205 Id. at 379.  
 206 See id.  
 207 Garcia v. Teitler 443 F.3d 202, 208 (2d Cir. 2006).  
 208 See Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 379–82.  
 209 See id.  
 210 See id. at 379–80. 
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in varying respects and degrees, factually interdependent. . . .”211 This language 
is similar to the supplemental jurisdiction statute that was passed roughly four 
years prior to this decision.212 That being said, the Court did not cite to the 
supplemental jurisdiction statute after the first prong,213 and therefore was 
referencing the version of ancillary jurisdiction that survived the passage of the 
supplemental jurisdiction statute.214 Thus, it is unclear whether that prong is 
intended to be as broad or broader than the statutory grant of supplemental 
jurisdiction. The court did, however, cite to Baker v. Gold Seal Liquors, Inc. and 
Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange in support of this prong.215  
In Baker v. Gold Seal Liquors, Inc., the petitioner was a trustee of a railroad 
company that was in bankruptcy reorganization.216 The trustee brought a claim 
against the respondent for a debt that it owed to the railroad company and the 
respondent filed a counterclaim.217 The petitioners, at the district court, filed a 
motion for summary judgment and asked the court to set off their claim with the 
respondent’s claim.218 The district court granted summary judgment and the 
Seventh Circuit affirmed.219  
The Supreme Court granted certiorari because of a conflict between the 
Seventh Circuit holding and separate Third Circuit and Supreme Court decisions 
in which claims were not permitted to offset against the petitioner.220 Unrelated 
to the purview of this Comment, the Supreme Court reversed.221 Pertinent, 
however, was the Court’s discussion regarding jurisdiction over 
counterclaims.222 The Court, citing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13 noted 
 
 211 Id.  
 212 See generally, 28 U.S.C. 1367 (2012); 13D CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, EDWARD H. 
COOPER, RICHARD D. FREER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3567 (3rd ed. 2008) (“[T]his form of 
jurisdiction permits a federal court to entertain a claim over which it would have no independent basis of subject 
matter jurisdiction.”). 
 213 See Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 379–80.  
 214 E.g., 13 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, Edward H. Cooper, Richard D. Freer, Federal Practice 
& Procedure § 3523.2 (3rd ed. 2008). 
 215 Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 380.  
 216 Baker v. Gold Seal Liqours, Inc., 417 U.S. 467, 468 (1974). According to Black’s Law Dictionary, 
“when bankruptcy is file[d] [bankruptcy reorganization] occurs. The company is analyzed by a trustee to 
liquidate assets and pay off claims.” What is Reorganization?, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, https:// 
thelawdictionary.org/reorganization/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2020).  
 217 Baker, 417 U.S. at 468.  
 218 Id. This would have resulted in a net gain for the respondent of over 11,000 dollars. Id.  
 219 Id.  
 220 See generally id. The conflict between Baker and the Third Circuit and Supreme Court cases is not 
relevant to the discussion of ancillary jurisdiction.  
 221 Id. The Supreme Court reversed because the district court and court of appeals’ holdings resulted in a 
form of discrimination against creditors that §77 of the Bankruptcy Act precluded. Id. at 474.  
 222 See id. at 469 n.1.  
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that “[i]f a counterclaim is compulsory, the federal court will have ancillary 
jurisdiction over it even though ordinarily it would be a matter for a state 
court. . . .”223 The Court further noted that under Rule 13(b), a party may assert 
a counterclaim even if it doesn’t arise from the same “transaction or occurrence 
that is the subject matter of the opposing parties claim.”224  
Furthermore, in Moore, the plaintiff’s original claim properly invoked the 
court’s jurisdiction under a federal statute.225 The defendant asserted a 
counterclaim that did not itself invoke the court’s jurisdiction.226 The district 
court dismissed the original claim by the plaintiff and despite not having original 
jurisdiction over the defendant’s counterclaim, entered an order granting the 
counterclaim.227 The Supreme Court, in affirming the district and appellate 
courts, held that the district court had properly asserted jurisdiction over the 
counterclaim because it was so closely intertwined with the claim originally 
invoking the court’s jurisdiction.228  
The first Kokkonen prong, in the context of the court’s holdings in Baker and 
Moore, which both involve counterclaims, appears to track the federal court’s 
authority to entertain counterclaims pursuant to Rule 13.229 The widest grant of 
jurisdiction in Rule 13 is for permissive counterclaims under subpart (b) of the 
rule.230 A court’s authority to hear permissive counterclaims under Rule 13(b) 
stems from the statutory grant of supplemental jurisdiction which allows a 
 
 223 Id.; see FED. R. CIV. P. 13(a).  
 224 Baker, 417 U.S. at 469 n.1. However, if the counterclaim does not arise from the same transaction or 
occurrence, it is therefore not compulsory, and either has to invoke the court’s jurisdiction itself, or qualify under 
supplemental jurisdiction to be heard by a district court. 6 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, MARY 
KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1422 (3rd ed. 2010) (explaining that permissive counterclaim 
must independently invoke the court’s jurisdiction or fall under the supplemental jurisdiction statute or, in some 
circuits, qualify as a setoff). The test for supplemental jurisdiction is fittingly boarder than the transaction or 
occurrence inquiry for Rule 13(a). See id. Supplemental jurisdiction permits a federal court to resolve claims 
that are part of the same case or controversy as the claim originally invoking the court’s jurisdiction. See id. 
(“[I]f a counterclaim is permissive it . . . nonetheless may qualify for supplemental jurisdiction if . . . it may be 
deemed part of the same controversy.”); Michelle S. Simon, Defining the Limits of Supplemental Jurisdiction 
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367: A Hearty Welcome to Permissive Counterclaims, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 295, 306 
(2005) (noting that the supplemental jurisdiction statute “extended supplemental jurisdiction to the constitutional 
limitation of ‘case or controversy’ under Article III”).  
 225 Moore v. N.Y. Cotton Exchange, 270 U.S. 593, 604 (1926).  
 226 Id. at 607–09.  
 227 Id. at 603.  
 228 Id. at 610.  
 229 See Baker, 417 U.S. at 469, n.1; Moore, 270 U.S. at 610 (Moore was decided prior to the passage of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); FED. R. CIV. P. 13.  
 230 FED. R. CIV. P. 13(b). Compulsory counterclaims under Rule 13(a) require a party to assert the 
counterclaim if it arises from the same transaction or occurrence as the event invoking the court’s jurisdiction. 
Supra note 228.  
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federal court to hear claims that are part of the same case or controversy as the 
primary claim.231 Nevertheless, the court did not mention Rule 13 at any point 
in the opinion.232 Therefore, in citing to Baker and Moore, it is unclear whether 
the court intended the outer limits of the first prong to extend as far as, or farther 
than, the outer limits of permissive counterclaims under Rule 13(b).233 
The language of the first prong could be construed to support a court’s 
exercise of ancillary enforcement jurisdiction that is broader than the grant of 
supplemental jurisdiction for a few reasons. First, the fact that the Court did not 
employ any of the language found in the supplemental jurisdiction statute or 
Rule 13,234 which were both effective at the time of the decision,235 indicates 
that the court did not intend to confine the first prong to the jurisdictional limits 
of either.236 Second, the language authorizing a court to resolve claims that are 
“in varying respects and degrees, factually interdependent,” is notably 
permissive.237 Lastly, there is no temporal component, unlike a Rule 13 
counterclaim which must be asserted during the original case, to the first 
prong.238 Hence, a claim related to the original case or controversy conceivably 
might be asserted several years down the line.239 
The second Kokkonen prong permits a federal court to assert ancillary 
enforcement jurisdiction “to enable a court to function successfully, that is, to 
manage its proceedings, vindicate its authority, and effectuate its 
decrees. . . .”240 In Kokkonen, the fact that the respondent was asking the Court 
to enforce a settlement agreement that was not incorporated into the Court’s 
order was the driving force behind the Court’s holding that it did not have 
jurisdiction to enforce the agreement.241 In support of the Supreme Court’s 
assertion that a federal court retains ancillary jurisdiction to enforce its orders, 
 
 231 Supra note 228 and accompanying text.  
 232 See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am. 511 U.S. 375 (1994).  
 233 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(b).  
 234 See Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 379–80.  
 235 Supplemental jurisdiction statute was passed in 1990. 28 U.S.C. §1367 (2012). And Rule 13 was 
adopted in 1937. FED R. CIV. P. 13. 
 236 See Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 379–80. 
 237 See id. 
 238 See id. 
 239 See, e.g., Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp. 496 U.S. 384, 395–96 (1990) (“[E]ven ‘years after the entry 
of a judgment on the merits’ a federal court could consider an award of counsel fees.” (quoting White v. N.H. 
Dep’t. of Emp’t Security, 455 U.S. 445, 451 n.13 (1982))).  
 240 Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 380 (citing Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991); United States v. 
Hudson, 11 U.S. 32, 34 (1812)). 
 241 Id. at 376–77. The court dismissed the respondent’s assertion that this fell under the first prong rather 
swiftly and effortlessly. Id. at 380–81. 
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the Court cited to its decisions, discussed in greater detail below, in United States 
v. Hudson and Chambers v. NASCO.242 
The Hudson decision was rendered not long after the Constitution was 
passed and was a catalyst for the idea of “inherent power” in federal courts.243 
The question presented to the Court was whether a federal court could hear state-
law criminal actions.244 In resolving this question, the Court acknowledged that 
because Congress has the authority to create inferior courts,245 Congress could 
necessarily limit them.246 That being said, the Court acknowledged that there are 
“[c]ertain implied powers [that] must necessarily result to our Courts of justice 
from the nature of their institution.”247 The Court further went on to say that 
there “are powers which cannot be dispensed with in a Court, because they are 
necessary to the exercise of all others . . . .”248 In other words, the Supreme Court 
recognized that for the judicial branch to have any backbone, some implied 
powers must inevitably flow directly from their grant of authority.249 Despite 
being drafted in 1812, these statements were immensely important to the 
development of a federal court’s authority to exercise “inherent power” to carry 
out its judgments.  
The issue of a court’s “inherent power” also arose in Chambers v. NASCO.250 
In Chambers, throughout the course of “a simple action for specific performance 
of a contract,” the petitioner and his counsel “emasculated and frustrated the 
purposes of these rules and the powers of the District Court . . . to prevent [the 
respondent’s] access to the remedy of specific performance.”251 Accordingly, 
after repeated egregious actions and misconduct by the petitioner and repeated 
threats of sanctions,252 the respondent moved for sanctions to be imposed.253 
 
 242 Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 380.  
 243 The decision was rendered in 1812. Hudson, 11 U.S. 32 (1812). 
 244 Id. at 32. The court ultimately held that the federal court did not have jurisdiction in this case. Id. at 34. 
 245 See U.S. CONST. art. III, §1. 
 246 Hudson, 11 U.S. at 33.  
 247 Id. at 34. 
 248 Id. 
 249 See id. 
 250 Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 35 (1991).. 
 251 Id. at 35–36 (citing NASCO Inc., v. Calcasieu Television & Radio, Inc., 623 F. Supp. 1372, 1383 (W.D. 
La. 1985)).  
 252 Id. at 36–41. The actions of the petitioner and their counsel can be summed up as: “(1) attempt[ing] to 
deprive this Court of jurisdiction by acts of fraud, nearly all of which were performed outside the confines of 
this Court, (2) fil[ing] false and frivolous pleadings, and (3) attempt[ing], by other tactics of delay, oppression, 
harassment and massive expense to reduce plaintiff to exhausted compliance.” Id. at 41 (quoting NASCO, Inc. 
v. Calcasieu Television & Radio, Inc., 124 F.R.D. 120, 138 (W.D. La. 1989), aff’d and remanded, 894 F.2d 696 
(5th Cir. 1990), aff’d sub nom. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991)). 
 253 Chambers, 501 U.S. at 40.  
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Although the district court recognized neither statutes nor the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure provided it with authority to impose sanctions in this situation, 
it nevertheless imposed sanctions, by invoking its “inherent power.”254 By 
relying on its inherent power, the district court imposed sanctions “in the form 
of attorney’s fees and expenses totaling” almost a million dollars.255 
On appeal, the petitioner argued that the district court did not have the 
inherent authority to impose sanctions for its conduct, but rather the court needed 
to look at state law in determining sanctions because this was a diversity case.256 
The court of appeals rejected the petitioner’s argument and stressed that a federal 
court’s inherent authority is independent but limited, to be used only when 
necessary.257 The Supreme Court granted certiorari “because of the importance” 
of the issues in the case.258  
The Supreme Court affirmed and provided a lengthy discussion of the 
breadth of courts’ inherent power.259 As an initial matter, in response to the 
petitioner’s argument that the court could only impose sanctions if given the 
authority by the Federal Rules or a statute, the Court explained that, “[t]hese 
other mechanisms, taken alone or together, are not substitutes for the inherent 
power, for that power is both broader and narrower than the other means of 
imposing sanctions.”260 These “implied powers” derive from the court’s need to 
have the authority to fully carry out its judgments and to control the parties and 
proceedings before the court.261  
This inherent authority, according to the Supreme Court, in the context of 
attorney’s fees, acts as an exception to the traditional “American Rule” of not 
shifting attorney’s fees.262 The exception that applied in this case was the court’s 
inherent power to “assess attorney’s fees when a party has acted in bad faith, 
vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.”263 Finding that this exception 
 
 254 Id. The statutory authorities that the Court noted did not grant it authority were 28 U.S.C. §1927 (2012) 
and the Federal Rule was Rule 11. Id. at 40–42. 
 255 Id. at 40.  
 256 Id. at 42.  
 257 Id.  
 258 Id.  
 259 See generally id. at 43–55.  
 260 Id. at 46. The court explained that to effectively carry out its functions, it needed the ability to act, in 
some circumstances, outside of the express grants of the Federal Rules and statutes. In support of this, the court 
stated that inherent power “extends to a full range of litigation abuses.” Id.  
 261 See id.  
 262 The “American Rule” is that the losing party in a case does not have to pay the prevailing party’s 
attorney’s fees. Alyeska Pipeline and Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975).  
 263 Chambers, 501 U.S. at 45–46. (quoting Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 258–59).  
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was met, the court held that the use of sanctions “in this instance transcends a 
court’s equitable power” and allows the court to “vindicat[e] judicial 
authority.”264 
In addition to examining the court’s inherent power in the attorney’s fees 
context, the Court in Chambers reviewed other areas and circumstances where 
courts have traditionally asserted their inherent authority.265 For instance, the 
Court expressed that “the power to punish for contempts is inherent in all courts” 
regardless of whether the contempt occurred inside or outside the walls of the 
court.266 The Court also noted that a federal court, through the exercise of its 
inherent authority, may vacate a judgment it rendered if “fraud has been 
perpetrated upon the court.”267 In enumerating these circumstances, the Court 
repeatedly stressed that a federal court’s inherent authority should not be 
employed liberally and should be exercised with restraint.268 
The Supreme Court’s decisions in Hudson and Chambers provide insight on 
how expansively to construe the facially broad language of the second Kokkonen 
prong.269 Although, the Court articulated in both Hudson and Chambers that 
inherent powers should be asserted only in limited circumstances, once a court’s 
ability to carry out its functions is impeded, the circumstances under which a 
court may assert its inherent powers do not appear all that limited.270 An 
impediment to the court’s ability to function properly does not have to be 
something that occurred inside the courtroom or relevant to the substantive 
claims of the suit.271 Furthermore, what threatens a courts ability to function may 
change over time and what is encompassed within the scope of the court’s 
authority to enforce its orders is not well-defined. A court may invalidate an 
order if it was perpetrated by fraud,272 but may a court lessen the penalty that an 
order imposed after a showing that the order resulted in more punishment than 
the court had intended to implement? 
 
 264 Chambers, 501 U.S. at 46 (quoting Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 689 n.14 (1978)). 
 265 See Chambers, 501 U.S. at 43–44.  
 266 Id. at 44 (citing Ex Parte Robinson, 86 U.S. 505, 510 (1874)).  
 267 Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44. In addition to circumstances noted in the text above, the court noted several 
other circumstances where a federal court may assert its inherent power. These circumstances include, inter alia: 
forbidding a disruptive criminal defendant from reentering the court room, “dismiss[ing] a suit for failure to 
prosecute,” and “the power to control admission to its bar and to discipline attorneys who appear before it.” Id. 
at 43–44.  
 268 Id. at 44–46.  
 269 See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am. 511 U.S. 375, 380 (1994).  
 270 See Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44–45; Hudson 11 U.S. at 34. 
 271 See, e.g., Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44. 
 272 Universal Oil Prod. Co. v. Root Refining Co., 328 U.S. 575, 580 (1946).  
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IV. EQUITABLE EXPUNGEMENT BEFORE AND AFTER KOKKONEN 
Before Kokkonen, it was well-settled amongst the circuit courts of appeal 
that a federal court retained ancillary enforcement jurisdiction and had the 
inherent power to expunge records based solely on equitable considerations.273 
A court, sitting in equity, would only grant expungement petitions in rare or 
extreme circumstances, balancing public policy considerations with the burden 
to the person with the record.274 However, after Kokkonen, the federal circuits 
began holding that expunging criminal records solely for equitable 
considerations did not fall under either of the two prongs enumerated in 
Kokkonen.275 
This Part will first discuss specific cases, prior to Kokkonen, that held federal 
courts had ancillary jurisdiction to expunge criminal records solely based on 
equitable considerations and provide examples of the balancing tests these 
courts used. Second, this Part will discuss the case law after Kokkonen that 
interpreted the two prongs to preclude the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction. Last, 
this Part will examine the decisions, mostly in the district courts in the Fourth 
Circuit, that have interpreted the second prong of Kokkonen to allow a court to 
exercise ancillary jurisdiction.  
A. Equitable Expungement Prior to Kokkonen  
This Section will examine pre-Kokkonen cases from the Second,276 
Seventh,277 and Eighth Circuits278 holding that a federal court has the inherent 
authority to expunge criminal records solely under equitable considerations. 
These same Circuits, however, subsequently found that Kokkonen overruled 
these prior decisions.279 After reviewing the pre-Kokkonen cases, this Section 
 
 273 See, e.g., United States v. Friesen, 853 F.2d 816, 817–18 (10th Cir. 1988) (holding the district court 
has the authority to expunge records in narrow circumstances); Allen v. Webster, 742 F.2d 153, 154–55 
(4th Cir. 1984) (holding the district court, in equity, did not abuse its discretion in denying a expungement 
petition based on equitable considerations); United States v. Schnitzer, 567 F.2d 536, 539 (2d Cir. 1977) (holding 
that absent a statute, expungement of criminal records “lies within the equitable discretion of the court”).  
 274 See, e.g., Friesen, 853 F.2d at 817; Allen, 742 F.2d at 155; Schnitzer, 567 F.2d at 539.  
 275 See, e.g., United States v. Wahi, 850 F.3d. 296, 302–03 (7th Cir. 2017); United States v. Coloian, 480 
F.3d 47, 50–52 (1st Cir. 2007); United States v. Sumner, 226 F.3d 1005, 1014 (9th Cir. 2000). The 4th and D.C. 
Circuits have not spoken on this issue.  
 276 Schnitzer, 567 F.2d at 539. 
 277 United States v. Flowers, 389 F.3d 737, 739 (7th Cir. 2004). Although Flowers was decided in 2004, 
after Kokkonen, the court in Flowers did not consider Kokkonen in its decision and relied on prior precedent 
within the circuit. See id. at 739. Hence, this case is being treated as if it were decided prior to Kokkonen. 
 278 United States v. Bagley, 899 F.2d 707, 708 (8th Cir. 1990). 
 279 See infra notes 332–356 and accompanying text; Meyer 439 F.3d at 861–62.  
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will then discuss a narrow strand of district court case law where the government 
supports the expungement motion and jurisdiction to expunge records has been 
maintained. 
In the Second Circuit, before Kokkonen, it was well-settled that a federal 
court had the inherent authority to expunge criminal records based solely on 
equitable considerations.280 In United States v. Schnitzer, the appellant was 
accused of conspiring with another party to defraud the Federal Insurance 
Administration and turned himself into the FBI.281 The FBI subsequently took 
the appellant’s photographs and thumbprints.282 The other party pled guilty, and 
the criminal charges were dropped against the appellant and instead, a civil 
action, that would later be dismissed, was filed by the government against the 
appellant.283 As part of the original criminal action against the appellant, he filed 
a petition for his records to be expunged as well as the photographs and 
fingerprints that were taken to be returned.284 After balancing the government’s 
and law enforcement’s interests against the appellants, the district court denied 
the petition.285 
On appeal, the appellant asserted that the district court lacked ancillary 
jurisdiction and because the criminal charges were dropped and civil suit was 
dismissed, his petition for expungement should have been sent to the Department 
of Justice and the FBI.286 In response, the Second Circuit explained that, 
irrespective of statutory authority, the criminal proceedings were rightfully 
within the jurisdiction of the district court.287 The Second Circuit further noted 
that “[a] court, sitting in a criminal prosecution, has ancillary jurisdiction to issue 
protective orders regarding dissemination of arrest records,”288 and made clear 
that a district court judge would have ancillary jurisdiction over any civil suit 
that was “related to the criminal action.”289 Ultimately the Second Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s decision and explained that expungement is only to 
be granted after the court has considered the “delicate balancing of the equities 
 
 280 E.g., Schintzer, 567 F.2d at 539. 
 281 Schnitzer, 567 F.2d at 537.  
 282 Id.  
 283 Id. at 537–38. 
 284 Id. at 538.  
 285 Id.  
 286 Id. 
 287 Id.  
 288 Id.  
 289 Id.  
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between the right of privacy of the individual and the right of law enforcement 
officials to perform their necessary duties.”290 
Likewise, in another pre-Kokkonen case, the Seventh Circuit reversed a 
district court’s grant of an expungement petition by reaching a similar 
conclusion to the court in Schnitzer. In United States v. Flowers, the appellee 
petitioned the district court to have her criminal records expunged to avoid any 
future employment barriers.291 The criminal record the appellee was attempting 
to have expunged was a guilty plea to “interfering with housing rights on the 
account of race” when she was eighteen.292 The district court found that the 
appellee had rehabilitated herself and that her interest in having her records 
expunged outweighed the public interest in preserving her records.293 Thus, the 
district court ordered the expunction of the record of her plea.294  
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit emphasized that the court had jurisdiction to 
hear the expungement petition295 but nonetheless held that the district court 
abused its discretion in granting expungement to the appellee.296 The court 
reasoned that the “unwarranted adverse consequences”297 required to grant an 
expungement petition were not present because the appellee did not supply the 
court with sufficient evidence to outweigh the public interest.298 The exercise of 
jurisdiction in this case is distinct from the exercise in Schnitzer.299 Here, the 
expungement petition was filed nearly eight years after the conclusion of the 
original case and primarily concerned actions that occurred after the original 
case concluded and actions that might occur in the future.300 This distinction is 
significant because the court in Flowers retained jurisdiction over an 
expungement petition where its relation to the original action was tenuous both 
temporally and in substance.301  
Further, in United States v. Bagley, another pre-Kokkonen case, the Eighth 
Circuit recognized the district court’s inherent jurisdiction to consider 
 
 290 Id. at 539 (quoting United States v. Rosen 343 F. Supp 804, 806 (S.D.N.Y. 1972)).  
 291 United States v. Flowers, 389 F.3d 737, 738 (7th Cir. 2004).  
 292 Id.  
 293 Id.  
 294 Id.  
 295 Id. at 739. 
 296 Id. at 740.  
 297 Id. at 739.  
 298 Id. at 740.  
 299 In Schnitzer, the expungement petition was filed during the original criminal action. United States v. 
Schnitzer, 567 F.2d 536, 536 (2d Cir. 1977).  
 300 See Flowers, 389 F.3d at 740.  
 301 Id. 
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expungement petitions302 and despite the dubious circumstances surrounding the 
petitioner’s arrest, nonetheless denied the petition.303 The evidence that resulted 
in the petitioner’s arrest and indictment was discovered in an illegal search.304 
Because the evidence was discovered in an illegal search, the district court 
granted the petitioner’s motion to suppress and ultimately, dismissed the 
indictment against the petitioner.305 With that being said, the district court denied 
the petitioner’s motion to expunge.306 On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reiterated 
that the court had jurisdiction to entertain this motion and affirmed the district 
court’s decision because the “adverse consequences” the petitioner showed were 
only “minimal.”307  
In addition to these three Circuit decisions, some district courts, prior to 
Kokkonen, wrestled with equitable expungement in an interesting context. This 
context developed regarding the expungement of records for individuals who 
were arrested, eventually found innocent, and the government supported the 
petitioner’s motion.308 In these exceptional circumstances, where the 
government concedes that harm to the defendant significantly outweighs the 
benefit to the public, district courts have ordered the expungement of the 
defendant’s records.309 However, there has been no appellate decision to date 
that has adopted these district court opinions.  
B. Equitable Expungement After Kokkonen  
After Kokkonen was decided, the prior agreement amongst the circuit courts, 
that they had the ancillary enforcement jurisdiction to equitably expunge 
criminal records, was called into question. The Supreme Court’s decision in 
Kokkonen was intended to clarify the reach of the ancillary jurisdiction 
doctrine.310 However, the test the Court adopted in Kokkonen was vague, and it 
is unclear if the Court intended the test to be the sole analysis a court should 
undertake in determining whether it may exercise ancillary jurisdiction.311 
 
 302 United States v. Bagley, 899 F.2d 707, 708 (8th Cir. 1990). See United States v. Meyer 439 F.3d 855, 
860 (8th Cir. 2006) (citing Bagley, 899 F.2d at 707–08) (“We have recognized, in cases predating Kokkonen, an 
inherent but narrow power to expunge federal criminal records in extreme cases.”).  
 303 Bagley, 899 F.2d at 708.  
 304 Id. at 707.  
 305 Id.  
 306 Id. at 708.  
 307 Id.  
 308 See United States v. Van Wagner, 746 F. Supp. 619, 621–23 (E.D. Va. 1990); United States v. Cook, 
480 F. Supp. 262, 263 (S.D. Tex. 1979); United States v. Bohr, 406 F. Supp. 1218, 1219–20 (E.D. Wis. 1976).  
 309 See Van Wagner, 746 F. Supp. at 621–23; Cook, 480 F. Supp. at 263–64; Bohr, 406 F. Supp. at 1220.  
 310 Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am. 511 U.S. 375, 379–80 (1994)..  
 311 Id. at 379-80.  
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Regarding expungement under equitable considerations, the Kokkonen decision 
resulted in circuit courts reconsidering whether their current position of retaining 
jurisdiction was still valid.312 All circuits that have directly addressed313 the issue 
have held that in light of Kokkonen, they no longer have the jurisdiction to 
entertain expungement petitions based solely on equitable grounds.314 
Conversely, there are several district court opinions, mainly in the Fourth,315 
Tenth316 and D.C. Circuits317 that buck this trend of determining that courts do 
not have jurisdiction to entertain these petitions.  
This Section will first analyze decisions from the Ninth,318 Second319 and 
Seventh320 Circuits, that hold that Kokkonen strips courts of the authority to 
expunge criminal records under equitable considerations. Then, this Section will 
review the district court jurisprudence that has come out on the other side of this 
issue.  
The Ninth Circuit was the first court of appeals to hold that Kokkonen 
precluded a district court from asserting ancillary jurisdiction to expunge 
criminal records solely under equitable considerations.321 In United States v. 
Sumner, the issue of whether a district court retained jurisdiction for 
expungement was a case of first impression in the Ninth Circuit.322 The court 
applied Kokkonen and concluded that the second prong “permits a district court 
to order the expungement of criminal records in cases over which it once 
exercised jurisdiction.”323 However, the court held that if the sole basis for the 
expungement petition is equity, then a court’s assertion of jurisdiction over the 
 
 312 See supra note 280 and accompanying text.  
 313 The 5th, 10th, and D.C. Circuits have not addressed this issue.  
 314 See United States v. Coloian, 480 F.3d 47, 51 n.6 (1st Cir. 2007); Doe v. United States, 833 F.3d 192, 
198 (2nd Cir. 2016); United States v. Rowlands 451 F.3d. 173, 177–78 (3rd. Cir. 2006); United States v. Mettetal, 
714 Fed.Appx. 230, 234–35 (4th Cir. 2017); United States. v. Field, 756 F.3d. 911, 916 (6th Cir. 2014); United 
States v. Wahi, 850 F.3d. 296, 302–03 (7th Cir. 2017); United States v. Meyer 439 F.3d 855, 861–62 (8th Cir. 
2006); United States v. Sumner, 226 F.3d 1005, 1014 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Adalikwu, No. 18-12591, 
2018 WL 6528446, at 2* (11th Cir. Dec. 12, 2018).  
 315 See, e.g., United States v. McKnight, 33 F. Supp. 3d 577, 582 (D. Md. 2014); United States v Allen, 
57 F. Supp. 3d 533, 541 (E.D.N.C. 2014).  
 316 See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 582 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1346-47 (D. Utah 2008); United States v. 
Brennan, No. 06–cr–00182–RBJ–1, 2015 WL 2208532, at 4* (D. Colo. Apr. 27, 2015).  
 317 See, e.g., United States v. Douglas, 282 F. Supp. 3d 275, 277 (D.D.C. 2017). 
 318 See Sumner, 226 F.3d at 1014.  
 319 See Doe, 833 F.3d at 198. 
 320 See United States v. Wahi, 850 F.3d. 296, 302–03 (7th Cir. 2017). 
 321 See Sumner, 226 F.3d at 1014. 
 322 Id.  
 323 Id.  
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petition would not further either of the “goals” of the Kokkonen test.324 The court 
reasoned that such a petition would not advance either of the “goals” because it 
neither facilitated the resolution of interrelated claims nor helped the court 
“vindicate its authority.”325 The court further clarified that for a district court to 
have jurisdiction over such a claim, it must obtain jurisdiction via a 
constitutional violation or a federal statute.326 
The Second Circuit in Doe v. United States followed the Ninth Circuit’s lead. 
When the Second Circuit decided Doe, several district courts in the Second 
Circuit had been presented with, and refused to determine, the jurisdictional 
issue that equitable expungement presents.327 These courts acknowledged that 
under pre-Kokkonen Second Circuit jurisprudence,328 their jurisdiction over 
equitable expungement petitions was unquestionable; however, in light of 
Kokkonen, they were uncertain if those earlier decisions were still good law.329 
In refusing to determine the jurisdictional issue, these courts uniformly denied 
the expungement petitions they were presented with.330 The courts reasoned that 
even if pre-Kokkonen precedent was still good law, the petitioners would not 
satisfy the standards for equitable expungement.331 
However, the district court in Doe v. United States reached a different 
conclusion.332 The district court held that it did have jurisdiction, under the 
second Kokkonen prong,333 to entertain the application to expunge the 
applicant’s fraud conviction.334 The district court’s rationale was that “few 
things could be more essential to ‘the conduct of federal-court business’ than the 
appropriateness of expunging the public records that business creates.”335 The 
 
 324 Id.  
 325 Id.  
 326 Id.  
 327 See United States v. Burzynski, No. 10-MJ-1134, 2016 WL 1604491, at 2* (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 22, 2016) 
(noting that the jurisdictional question was “unsettled” and denying the petition because “even if jurisdiction did 
exist” it would not constitute an extreme circumstance); United States v. DeBerry, No. 05–MJ–62, 2013 WL 
6816626, at 2* (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2013) (same); United States v. Barlow, No. 01–CR–114–A, 2012 WL 
125150, at 2* (W.D.N.Y Jan. 17, 2012) (same).  
 328 See supra notes 292–294 and accompanying text.  
 329 See Burzynski, 2016 WL 1604491, at *2; DeBerry, 2013 WL 6816626, at *2; Barlow, 2012 WL 
125150, at *2. 
 330 See Burzynski, 2016 WL 1604491, at *3; DeBerry, 2013 WL 6816626, at *3; Barlow, 2012 WL 
125150, at *3. 
 331 See Burzynski, 2016 WL 1604491, at *2; DeBerry, 2013 WL 6816626, at *2; Barlow, 2012 WL 
125150, at *2. 
 332 Doe v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 3d 448, n.16 (E.D.N.Y 2015).  
 333 See supra note 244 and accompanying text.  
 334 Doe, 110 F. Supp. 3d at 454 n.16. 
 335 Id.  
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government appealed, resulting in the Second Circuit’s first encounter with 
expungement after Kokkonen.336 
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed.337 The court rejected the assertion 
by the applicant and the district court that expunging “vindicate[d] its sentencing 
decree” and therefore satisfied Kokkonen’s second prong.338 The Second Circuit 
maintained the time period between the applicant’s motion and the serving of 
her sentence339 was too great and therefore expunging the applicants record was 
“unnecessary to . . . effectuate its decrees.”340 The applicant alternatively 
claimed that her petition for expungement was “factually interdependent” with 
her criminal proceedings and therefore qualified under the first prong.341 The 
appellate court was unpersuaded and rejected the applicant’s argument because 
“analytically” the original criminal proceedings and the motion for expungement 
were too far apart in time.342 Although the Second Circuit denied the applicant’s 
motion, the court suggested that legislative action could prevent “unfortunate” 
outcomes such as this one.343 The court hinted that Congress “might consider” 
passing another expungement statute.344 
Similar to the Second Circuit, the Seventh Circuit had already developed a 
strong body of case law supporting jurisdiction over the expunging of criminal 
records solely under equitable considerations before Kokkonen was decided.345 
This topic was revisited in United States v. Wahi, where the Seventh Circuit 
overruled prior precedent and held that district courts could no longer exercise 
its ancillary jurisdiction in the equitable expungement context.346  
The Seventh Circuit held that its prior precedent could not be “reconciled” 
with the Kokkonen decision because neither prong could be satisfied.347 In 
addressing the interrelatedness prong, the court held that this type of 
expungement petition will always rely on events and circumstances that arise 
 
 336 Doe v. United States, 833 F.3d 192, 194–95 (2d Cir. 2016). 
 337 Id. at 200.  
 338 Id. at 198.  
 339 The applicants sentence ended seven years prior. Id. at 194.  
 340 Id. at 198 (quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am. 511 U.S. 375, 380 (1994)). 
 341 Id. (quoting Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 379 (1994)). 
 342 Id.  
 343 Id. at 199.  
 344 Id.  
 345 See, e.g., United States v. Flowers, 389 F.3d 737, 739 (7th Cir. 2004); United States v. Janik, 10 F.3d 
470 (7th Cir. 1993).  
 346 United States v. Wahi, 850 F.3d. 296, 298 (7th Cir. 2017).  
 347 Id.  
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after the case has ended and that this inquiry was “frankly, a policy choice.”348 
Moreover, concerning whether equitable expungement aids a court in 
“manag[ing] its proceedings” or “effectuat[ing] its decrees,” the court held that 
the power to provide that remedy was neither necessary nor corollary for the 
court to able to carry out its business.349 This remedy was not necessary for the 
conduct of court business because “the criminal proceedings [were] over.”350 In 
addition to finding that equitable expungement did not satisfy the Kokkonen test, 
the court disconcertingly explained that the Seventh Circuit’s “status as an 
outlier” amongst the circuit courts was a “compelling reason” to overturn prior 
precedent.351  
Notwithstanding the fact every federal appellate court that has directly 
addressed the issue of expungement since Kokkonen has held that courts lack 
ancillary jurisdiction, there have been several district court decisions, in addition 
to the district court in Doe v. United States,352 that have found to the contrary.353 
One of the leading decisions favoring a court’s jurisdiction to hear expungement 
petitions arose in the context where the charges against the defendant had been 
dismissed.354 In that case, the court ordered the expunction of the defendant’s 
five-year-old arrest record for shoplifting.355 Although the court found that the 
motion was not interrelated enough to warrant jurisdiction under the first 
Kokkonen factor, the court analogized an expungement petition to a 
“modification or revocation of supervised release” and found that it satisfied the 
second factor because it helped the court “effectuate its decrees.”356 
Intriguingly, multiple district courts within the Tenth Circuit, citing post-
Kokkonen Tenth Circuit authority, have asserted jurisdiction over equitable 
expungement motions and rejected the argument that Kokkonen precludes 
jurisdiction.357 The decision these courts cite to is Camfield v. City of Oklahoma 
 
 348 Id. at 302. 
 349 Id. (quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am. 511 U.S. 375, 380 (1994)). 
 350 Id.  
 351 Id. at 303.  
 352 Doe v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 3d 448, n.16 (E.D.N.Y 2015).  
 353 See United States v. McKnight, 33 F. Supp. 3d 577 (D. Md. 2014); United States v Allen, 57 F. Supp. 
3d 533 (E.D.N.C. 2014).; United States v. Williams, 582 F. Supp. 2d 1345 (D. Utah 2008) United States v. 
Douglas, 282 F. Supp. 3d 275 (D.D.C. 2017).  
 354 See McKnight, 33 F. Supp. 3d at 582.  
 355 Id. at 587.  
 356 Id. at 582.  
 357 See, e.g., United States v. Brennan, No. 06–cr–00182–RBJ–1, 2015 WL 2208532, at 5* (D. Colo. Apr. 
27, 2015); United States v. Williams, No. 08–CR–0021–CVE, 2011 WL 489771, at *3 (N.D. Okla. Feb. 7, 
2011). Both decisions cite to Camfield v. City of Okla. City, 248 F.3d 1214, 1234 (10th Cir. 2001), which was 
decided seven years after Kokkonen. 
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City,358 decided seven years after Kokkonen, where the Tenth Circuit stressed 
that “[i]t is well settled in this circuit that courts have inherent equitable authority 
to order the expungement of an arrest record or a conviction in rare or extreme 
instances.”359 In further support of their position, the district courts maintain that 
because Kokkonen does not address ancillary jurisdiction in criminal actions, 
they are bound by prior precedent that asserts jurisdiction over these motions.360 
However, Camfield does not address Kokkonen.361  
V. THE CONSTRAINING MISINTERPRETATION OF KOKKONEN 
The Supreme Court in Kokkonen stated that the “expansive language” it 
employed in a prior ancillary jurisdiction decision was being construed too 
broadly, and its holding in Kokkonen was intended to clarify the scope of the 
doctrine.362 The test that Kokkonen articulated explained that ancillary 
jurisdiction had traditionally been asserted “(1) to permit disposition by a single 
court of claims that are, in varying respects and degrees, factually 
interdependent; and (2) to enable a court to function successfully, that is, to 
manage its proceedings, vindicate its authority, and effectuate its decrees.”363 
This decision has led to an unwarranted and constricting interpretation of the 
ancillary jurisdiction doctrine in the expungement context. This Comment 
argues that the holding and language of Kokkonen coupled with traditional 
assertions of ancillary jurisdiction and the case law cited after the enumeration 
of the prongs do not warrant such a constraining interpretation. 
Further, this Comment concedes that expunging of criminal records under 
solely equitable considerations may not fall fully in either of the prongs as 
separate entities. However, this Comment argues that equitable expungement 
falls in between the two prongs. This Kokkonen (1.5) area between the two 
prongs consists of a melding of the “sometimes related purposes” language in 
Kokkonen as it links the two prongs364 and the philosophy behind supplemental 
jurisdiction.365 
 
 358 248 F.3d 1214 (10th Cir. 2001). 
 359 Id. at 1234. 
 360 See Williams, 2011 WL 489771, at 3* n.2; Brennan, 2015 WL 2208532, at *5. 
 361 See Camfield, 248 F.3d at 1234–35 (discussing the expungement issue without mentioning Kokkonen).  
 362 Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 378–79 (1994) (citing Julian v. Cent. Tr. Co., 
193 U.S. 93, 113–14 (1904)).  
 363 Id. at 379–80 (citations omitted). 
 364 Id. 
 365 See supra notes 144–147.  
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A. The Misinterpretation  
In the paragraph before the Supreme Court enumerated the Kokkonen 
prongs, the Court acknowledged that “[t]he doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction can 
hardly be criticized for being overly rigid or precise . . . .”366 This was in 
response to the argument that, based on the language in the Supreme Court’s 
holding in Julian v. Central Trust Co., a federal court could exercise its ancillary 
jurisdiction to enforce a settlement agreement that was not incorporated into the 
order dismissing the suit.367  
The language from Julian relied upon in support of this argument was “[a] 
bill filed to continue a former litigation . . . to obtain and secure the fruits, 
benefits and advantages of the proceedings . . . or to obtain any equitable relief 
in regard to, or connected with, or growing out of, any judgment or proceeding 
. . . is an ancillary suit.”368 Unquestionably, under this language a district court 
would have, and in fact did have,369 ancillary jurisdiction over a motion to 
expunge criminal records for solely equitable considerations. However, in 
Kokkonen, the Supreme Court back-tracked on that language and concluded that 
“the holding of Julian was not remotely as permissive as its language . . . .”370 
Similarly, the holding of Kokkonen is not as restrictive as it is being 
interpreted. The holding was that a federal court did not have ancillary 
jurisdiction over a settlement agreement, which is a separate contract, that was 
not incorporated into the order dismissing the suit.371 In other words, the Court 
held that a federal court cannot assert jurisdiction over a breach of contract 
claim, which is governed by state law, unless it has its own basis for subject 
matter jurisdiction.372 This holding, coupled with the language preceding the 
Kokkonen prongs and the case law that is cited after each prong, demonstrate 
that the circuit courts have been construing Kokkonen far too narrowly regarding 
a court’s jurisdiction over expungement petitions.  
The language that precedes the two Kokkonen prongs is notably amorphous. 
The Supreme Court first acknowledged that the scope of the ancillary 
jurisdiction doctrine was ill-defined,373 and then directly before enumerating the 
 
 366 Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 379.  
 367 Id. at 378–79.  
 368 Id. at 379 (citing Julian v. Cent. Tr. Co., 193 U.S. 93, 113–14 (1904)). 
 369 See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
 370 Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 379.  
 371 Id. at 380–81.  
 372 See supra note 199. 
 373 Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 379–80.  
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test added a qualifier: “[g]enerally speaking, we have asserted ancillary 
jurisdiction . . . for two separate, though sometimes related, purposes . . . .”374 
By mentioning that the scope of the ancillary jurisdiction doctrine was ill-
defined and then prefacing the prongs with a qualifier, the Court was not 
intending to have the two prongs be a strict standard for a court’s ability to assert 
ancillary jurisdiction.375 Instead, the court was likely attempting to avoid 
defining the parameters of the doctrine, as the Court referred to it, that could 
“hardly be criticized for being overly rigid or precise.”376 Moreover, it is highly 
doubtful that the Supreme Court, in deciding Kokkonen and setting out the 
prongs, was attempting to overrule circuit court decisions in nearly every circuit 
that held that district courts had ancillary jurisdiction to expunge criminal 
records solely under equitable considerations.377  
Further supporting the idea that equitable expungement falls within the 
Supreme Court’s holding in Kokkonen are historical exercises of ancillary 
jurisdiction378 and the case law cited to after each of the prongs.379 Regarding 
historical exercises of ancillary jurisdiction, drawing parallels between a court’s 
ability to exercise ancillary jurisdiction to resolve attorney’s fees disputes is 
particularly illustrative. Unlike equitable petitions for the expunging of criminal 
records, attorney’s fees disputes have nothing to do with substance of the action 
invoking the court’s jurisdiction.380 Moreover, similar to how the balancing test 
for equitable expungement petitions may depend on events that transpire after 
the decision has been rendered,381 an attorney’s fees dispute may require an 
inquiry into actions that occurred outside of the court room and potentially after 
the suit had concluded. However, courts routinely exercise jurisdiction over 
these issues.382 It can hardly be argued that in this manner, under the test 
Kokkonen articulates and particularly in light of the “sometimes related 
purposes” language, a federal court would be able to assert ancillary jurisdiction 
to resolve an attorney’s fee dispute, but not an equitable expungement 
petition.383  
 
 374 Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 379.  
 375 See id.  
 376 See id.  
 377 See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
 378 See supra notes 156–182 and accompanying text. 
 379 See supra notes 212–276 and accompanying text.  
 380 Supra notes 181–182 and accompanying text.  
 381 Supra note 353 and accompanying text.  
 382 Supra note 182 and accompanying text.  
 383 See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 379–80 (1994).  
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In addition to the traditional exercises of ancillary jurisdiction, the cases 
cited after each of the Kokkonen prongs weigh in favor of a broad interpretation 
of the Kokkonen holding. For example, the cases that are cited after the first 
prong, both of which involve counterclaims,384 are related to FED. R. CIV. P. 13, 
which encompasses counterclaims.385 However, the Court did not address Rule 
13 in enumerating this prong nor at any point in its decision.386 This lack of 
reference to Rule 13, coupled with the broad scope of permissive counterclaims 
pursuant to Rule 13(b),387 militates towards the interpretation that the first prong 
casts a wide net over related claims and proceedings. Additionally, the case law 
that the Court employed to support its assertion that a federal court retains 
ancillary jurisdiction to “effectuate” its orders and “manage its proceedings” 
further gives credence to a broader interpretation of the prongs.388 These cases 
involve situations in which a court’s ability to function and carry out its 
proceedings properly is impeded.389 They hold that once a court’s ability to 
function is obstructed, the court has the inherent authority to alleviate the issue 
in a manner that allows the court to function properly.390 In the equitable 
expungement context, the assertion that a court’s exercise of ancillary 
jurisdiction does not tend to support a court’s ability to carry out its functions, 
by ensuring that its decrees are not given more effect than intended,391 is shaky 
at best. The assertion is shaky because the stigma attached to a criminal record 
reasonably can be, and should be, viewed as an “invisible punishment.”392 
With that being said, the language of Kokkonen further supports the grounds 
for district courts to assert ancillary jurisdiction over equitable expungement 
motions.393 Admittedly, if the prongs were to be taken distinctly as two separate 
avenues for jurisdiction, as interpreted by the circuits that now hold they lack 
jurisdiction over these motions,394 the argument for ancillary jurisdiction 
becomes more tenuous. However, the Court in Kokkonen stated that, on 
 
 384 Supra notes 215–243 and accompanying text.  
 385 See supra note 233 and accompanying text.  
 386 See supra note 233 and accompanying text. 
 387 See supra note 228 and accompanying text.  
 388 Supra notes 244–277 and accompanying text. 
 389 Supra notes 244–277 and accompanying text. 
 390 Supra notes 244–277 and accompanying text. 
 391 See United States v. McKnight, 33 F. Supp. 3d 577, 582 (D. Md. 2014); United States v. Allen, 57 F. 
Supp. 3d 533, 541 (E.D.N.C. 2014); Doe v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 3d 448, 454 n.16 (E.D.N.Y. 2015).  
 392 See Carey, supra note 38, at 546. 
 393 See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 379–80 (1994).  
 394 See, e.g., Doe v. United States, 833 F.3d 192, 198 (2d Cir. 2016) (addressing each prong separately); 
United States v. Wahi, 850 F.3d 296, 302–03 (7th Cir. 2017) (same); United States v. Sumner, 226 F.3d 1005, 
1014 (9th Cir. 2000) (same).  
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occasion, the prongs are grounds for ancillary jurisdiction for “sometimes 
related purposes,”395 and that is squarely where equitable expungement falls.  
B. The Area in Between the Prongs: Kokkonen (1.5) 
Although expungement under solely equitable considerations may not fall 
precisely in either of the two prongs distinctly, when Kokkonen is considered in 
light of the “sometimes related purposes” language396 and the philosophy behind 
supplemental jurisdiction,397 the notion that it falls between the two prongs 
becomes clear.  
The traditional balancing test for the expungement of criminal records is one 
of the strongest indicators that equitable expungement falls into the “sometimes 
related purposes” language of Kokkonen.398 Historically, the balancing test for 
the expungement of criminal records weighs the petitioner’s interest in having 
their records expunged against the public’s interest in having the records widely 
available.399 Here is where the “sometimes related purposes” of the two prongs 
arises.400  
The first prong of the Kokkonen analysis allows the exercise of ancillary 
jurisdiction to “permit disposition by a single court of claims that are, in varying 
respects and degrees, factually interdependent . . . .”401 Concededly, a 
considerable portion of the balancing test will require examining facts that 
occurred after the conclusion of the case, such as a lack of housing and 
employment opportunities.402 However, nowhere in the Kokkonen test does the 
Court place a temporal restriction on the assertion of ancillary jurisdiction.403 
Additionally, the balancing test also necessarily requires an inquiry into the facts 
of the original case.404 These facts include what the crime was, whether the 
petitioner was found guilty, whether this was the petitioner’s first offense, and 
whether there was sufficient evidence presented for a jury to convict.405 The 
 
 395 Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 379.  
 396 Id.  
 397 Supra notes 144–147 and accompanying text. 
 398 Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 379. 
 399 E.g., United States v. Schnitzer, 567 F.2d 536, 539 (2d Cir. 1977).  
 400 Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 379–80.  
 401 Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 379–80. 
 402 E.g., United States v. McKnight, 33 F. Supp. 3d 577, 584–85 (D. Md. 2014).  
 403 Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 379–80.  
 404 Doe v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 3d 448, 454 n.16 (E.D.N.Y. 2015).  
 405 See United States v. Bagley, 899 F.2d 707, 708 (8th Cir. 1990) (explaining that because the defendant’s 
arrest records and indictment “represent valuable law enforcement records,” balancing of the interests weighed 
in favor of denying expungement); United States v. Friesen, 853 F.2d 816, 818 (10th Cir. 1988) (examining 
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utilization of these facts further have the potential to play a factor in determining 
whether a court’s order is effectuated properly and has not resulted in over-
punishment. Moreover, a substantial part of weighing the public’s interest in 
having the records available is what the public is being protected from.406 This 
additionally will hinge on the facts of the prior case.407 
Similar to the inquiry under the first prong, the assertion of jurisdiction for 
equitable expungement may not fall precisely within the language of the second 
prong.408 The second prong stipulates that ancillary jurisdiction may be asserted 
“to enable the court to function successfully, that is, to manage its proceedings, 
vindicate its authority, and effectuate its decrees . . . .”409 The court and the 
public as a whole have an interest in the court’s ability to ensure that its decrees 
are effectuated appropriately and its sentencing has not resulted in over-
penalizing.410 The stigma attached to a criminal record and the consequences 
that flow from it411 can be in in direct conflict with the interests of a court and 
the public in this regard. Moreover, this stigma can be analogized to a supervised 
release412 or an “invisible punishment”413 not intended to be levied by the court. 
In this framework, it logically follows that expunging a criminal record under 
solely equitable considerations would aid a court in “effectuat[ing] its decrees” 
and “vindicat[ing] its authority.”414  
When this inquiry is taken in tandem with, or for the “related purposes” of,415 
the inquiry under the first prong, the concept that equitable expungement falls 
within the language of Kokkonen between the two prongs is solidified. The 
concept of a Kokkonen (1.5) area in between the two prongs is supported by a 
 
whether there was sufficient evidence to convict the petitioner); United States v. Linn, 513 F.2d 925, 927 (10th 
Cir. 1975) (recognizing the relevance of the validity of the arrest); Doe v. United States, 168 F. Supp. 3d. 427, 
440 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (holding that the defendant’s “criminal case and her expungement motion” satisfied the 
first prong); United States v. Brennan, No. 06–cr–00182–RBJ–1, 2015 WL 2208532, at *3 (D. Colo. Apr. 27, 
2015) (“jurisdiction is inextricably linked to the unique facts of this case”). 
 406 See Criminal Procedure—Ancillary Jurisdiction—District Court Grants Motion to Expunge 
Conviction for Equitable Reasons.—Doe v. United States, No. 14-MC-1412, 2015 WL 2452613 (E.D.N.Y. May 
21, 2015), 129 HARV. L. REV. 582, 588 (2015).  
 407 Id.  
 408 See, e.g., supra note 319.  
 409 Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 380 (1994).  
 410 See Doe, 168 F. Supp. 3d at 440 (“I have an interest in ensuring that the sentence is ‘effectuated’ 
properly.”).  
 411 Supra notes 24–52 and accompanying text.  
 412 See United States v. McKnight, 33 F. Supp. 3d 577, 582 (D. Md. 2014).  
 413 See Carey, supra note 38 at 546. 
 414 See Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 380.  
 415 Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 379.  
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merging of the philosophy embedded in the supplemental jurisdiction statute416 
and the exercise of ancillary enforcement jurisdiction that survived the passage 
of the statute.417 Although the Supreme Court did not reference supplemental 
jurisdiction in Kokkonen418 and therefore was likely not intending to comment 
on supplemental jurisdiction, when the language of the first prong is mirrored 
against the language of the supplemental jurisdiction statute it is apparent that, 
at the least, the philosophy behind the statute is doing some work. The first 
Kokkonen prong states that ancillary jurisdiction has commonly been exercised 
“to permit disposition by a single court of claims that are, in varying respects 
and degrees, factually interdependent . . . .”419 In comparison, the supplemental 
jurisdiction statue, with some exceptions, permits a court to exercise jurisdiction 
“over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such 
original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under 
Article III . . . .”420  
The similarities in these grants of jurisdiction are striking and thus the 
philosophy behind the supplemental jurisdiction statue does appear to be of 
consequence. This philosophy is that, although a claim may not invoke a court’s 
original jurisdiction, it is more efficient and convenient for the parties to have 
the related claim resolved in one forum.421 Superimposing this philosophy onto 
the “related purposes” of the two Kokkonen prongs it is apparent how 
“permit[ing] disposition by a single court of claims that are, in varying respects 
and degrees, factually interdependent . . . to enable a court to function 
successfully, that is, to manage its proceedings, vindicate its authority, and 
effectuate its decrees,”422 promotes efficiency and convenience. Thus 
empowering a court to assert ancillary jurisdiction over equitable expungement 
petitions that have some factual interdependence to the original action and 
further a court’s interest in not having its decrees results in unintended 
punishment.  
This interpretation of Kokkonen will restore the district courts’ ability to 
exercise ancillary enforcement jurisdiction to entertain expungement petitions 
under solely equitable considerations. District courts will not have to look far for 
 
 416 See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2012).  
 417 Supra note 146–151 and accompanying text. 
 418 See Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 379–80.  
 419 Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 379–80 (emphasis added).  
 420 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (emphasis added).  
 421 See 13D CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, EDWARD H. COOPER, RICHARD D. FREER, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3567 (3d ed. 2008). 
 422 Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 379–80 (citations omitted). 
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the appropriate balancing test to resolve expungement petitions because there 
are circuit court decisions in nearly every circuit that perform the balancing 
test.423 The implications of this jurisdiction will not result in a mass granting of 
expungement petitions. Expungement is still warranted only in the “exceptional 
circumstances” where the private interests outweigh the public interests in 
expungement.424 Hopefully, however, this will allow for individuals, whose 
record has acted as a moratorium on their ability to function in society, to be 
able to live their lives without having to be encumbered by a criminal record.  
CONCLUSION 
This Comment argues that all but three of the circuit courts have 
misinterpreted the Supreme Court’s holding in Kokkonen v. Guardian Life 
Insurance Co. of America by holding that it precludes district courts from 
asserting ancillary jurisdiction over motions to expunge criminal records solely 
under equitable considerations. The Supreme Court in Kokkonen was attempting 
to clarify a prior ancillary jurisdiction holding that, in its view, was being read 
too expansively. Coincidentally, Kokkonen led to the circuit courts’ interpreting 
ancillary jurisdiction too narrowly regarding its jurisdiction over equitable 
expungement petitions. 
This narrow reading of Kokkonen has removed a tool that district courts had 
traditionally used to alleviate some of the issues, through expungement, that 
criminal records present. Although expungement is a limited remedy, only to be 
granted in extraordinary circumstances, it has the potential to help some 
individuals where their interests and fundamental fairness outweigh the public’s 
interest in maintaining the records. Thus, this detaches individuals from the 
cycle of lack of employment and housing opportunities and ultimate recidivism. 
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